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Lijun He 
What Drives Change? Examining Wealthy Chinese Entrepreneurs’ Creation of 
Foundations: An Institutional Entrepreneurship Theory Perspective 
 
A significant literature gap exists in our understanding of the motivating mechanism 
for creation of foundations by philanthropist, a rapid paradigm shift that is occurring in 
many countries. This study aims to address the literature gap by discovering Chinese 
entrepreneurs’ heterogeneous responses to the conditions that may lead to creation of 
their own foundations. Adopting the institutional entrepreneurship theory, which 
examines agency/ change breaking in from an old institution, the researcher tested and 
operationalized four major factors derived from the institutional entrepreneurship 
theory—i.e. conflict, heterogeneity, institutional logic, and power—to account for the 
behavioral change. Through investigating 209 wealthy Chinese entrepreneurs from the 
2003-2004 Top 100 Philanthropists List produced by the Hurun Research Institute, 
utilizing the event history analysis method, the study discovered that among the four 
factors only heterogeneity resulting from strategic industry intersection and the 
entrepreneurs’ political power are the antecedents of their creation of foundations. Other 
factors—such as conflict, heterogeneity resulted from civil network, and institutional 
logic—were not relevant in this study. These results suggest that Chinese entrepreneurs 
who benefit from their improved political and social standing and increased capital are 
also making endeavors to take initiatives to contribute to the social and economic 
well-beings in the social areas that the entrepreneurs’ industry intersect heavily. This 
study enriches our understanding of the creation of foundations from entrepreneurs’ 
 vi 
contextual background in an emerging market. The empirical validation of the 
antecedents of behavior change, and civic leadership innovation also provides practical 
implications for policy-makers, philanthropy advisers, and nonprofit leaders. 
Key words: wealthy entrepreneurs, creation of foundations, institutional 
entrepreneurship, emerging market  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Overall Research Background on Entrepreneurs and Philanthropy 
The history of entrepreneurs’ engagement in philanthropy is long and storied. 
Benjamin Franklin, Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, James Buchanan Duke, 
Charles Schwab, Cornelius Vanderbilt, Pierre Omidyar, Bill Gates, and Warren Buffet are 
among those whose names are easily recognizable as much for their philanthropic efforts 
as for their entrepreneurial efforts. The research on entrepreneurs and philanthropy only 
recently became a topic of scholar interest (Acs, 2013; Taylor, Strom, Renz, 2014). In an 
ever-growing global economy and rapid wealth accumulation that have resulted from a 
plethora of entrepreneurs, the entrepreneurs’ engagement in philanthropy is of ultimate 
importance to enhance the economic, political, and societal well-beings (Acs, 2013). The 
key to achieve these aforementioned goals is entrepreneurs’ voluntary dismantling of 
their wealth concentration through institutionalized giving. Institutional giving denotes a 
philanthropic foundation that reflects entrepreneurs’ personal civic values, guided by a 
long-term strategic vision for the public good. Moreover, it is managed by professional 
staff, creates or supports nonprofit organizations to deliver public goods and contest the 
public value, and addresses social problems in a systematic and scientific way (Anheier 
& Hammack, 2010; Hall, 2006). Philanthropy, in this context, is distinguished from 
charity. Specifically speaking, philanthropy focuses on long-term development and 
addresses social problems by creating opportunities for potential development, whereas 
charity focuses on short-term relief (Payton & Moody, 2008). Foundation or institutional 
philanthropy is one of the major vehicles for entrepreneurs and other high-net-worth 
individuals carrying out philanthropy in the United States and many other western 
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countries. Philanthropy, in this study, is narrowly confined to examining big philanthropic 
foundations. 
Entrepreneurs’ philanthropic foundations benefit the economy, political climate, and 
social justice in the following aspects: 
First of all, entrepreneurs’ use of philanthropic foundations eases the fundamental 
tension inherent to capitalism: creation of wealth and maintenance of opportunities (Acs, 
2013). The philanthropic foundations created by American entrepreneurs have played a 
crucial role in reforming and supporting higher education systems, arts and culture, 
public schools, health care, and the like (Anheier & Hammack, 2010); thus do they 
generate many opportunities and innovations for the American economy through 
provisioning and sustaining these organizations (Acs, 2013). For instance, Julius 
Rosenwald (1862–1932), a co-owner and leader of Sears, Roebuck & Company, created 
immense opportunities for today’s American economy through his Rosenwald Fund, 
which initiated and supported 5,357 public schools in 883 counties of 15 states in the 
South (Werner, 1939). 
Second, entrepreneurs’ dismantling their wealth concentration through philanthropy 
is essential to democracy. The high concentration of wealth may lead to plutocracy; 
however, tycoons and philanthropists, like Andrew Carnegie, who became healthy 
contributors to a democratic country while answering the high call of “gospel of wealth.” 
Alexis de Tocqueville noted, “What is most important for democracy is not that great 
fortunes should not exist, but that great fortunes should not remain in the same hands” 
(Alexis de Tocqueville, n.d.). Moreover, the financial support from philanthropic 
foundations is essential to bulwark the nonprofit sector’s striking features: pluralism and 
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independence (Gardner, 1979); thus, democracy is further advanced through the nonprofit 
sector that continuously contests “what is public good” and engages in advocacy (Payton 
& Moody, 2008). 
Third, releasing wealth concentration at the top of society and producing the most 
good for the community is an important way to achieve social justice. Andrew Carnegie 
set a good example in explaining the gospel of wealth and by being a good steward of 
wealth to redress education inequity. In addition, successful entrepreneurs bring talents 
that drive their business success to accelerate and refresh the philanthropic sector in 
achieving social equity. They also use their social influences to seek change at policy 
levels (Bishop & Green, 2008). The Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation is a case in point. 
Bill Gates not only utilizes his massive philanthropic fund to support education, global 
health, and community development, but also capitalize on his influence to mobilize 
more wealthy entrepreneurs to pledge their wealth to address social problems (ibid, 
2008). 
The creation of philanthropic foundations was regarded as America’s great invention 
in the late 18th century when George Peabody established Peabody Education Fund, 
which innovated the emergence of later major foundations, including Russell Sage 
Foundation, John D. Rockefeller Foundation, and the Carnegie Cooperation (Acs, 2012). 
Many businessmen have followed suit and left a legacy of hope for many generations to 
come. In the new era of public administration that emphasizes cross-sectorial 
collaboration, it is very important for policy-makers to release society’s energy in the 
pursuit of the public good. Policy-makers should understand and help create the 
conditions to incubate innovation to nurture and help reset the goals for entrepreneurial 
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philanthropic giving (Taylor, Strom, & Renz, 2014). With the above background and 
rationale, this study's research questions emerge. 
• How are successful Chinese entrepreneurs’ philanthropy like and are they 
practicing philanthropy or just charitable giving? 
• Do the Chinese nouveau riche establish their foundations? 
• What factors account for their heterogeneous responses to the conditions of 
foundation creation? 
The importance of these questions is demonstrated by all of the earlier discussions of 
entrepreneurs’ engagement in philanthropy. In addition, there is one more alarming fact to 
consider: 27% of wealthy Chinese entrepreneurs have already emigrated, while another 
47% are considering doing so (Ti, 2012). China is going to bear a huge loss if 70% of its 
wealthy class wants to leave the place where they were born and made their fortune. Such 
a massive migration creates a different sense of awareness about place and needed 
changes. The situation grows even more formidable when 80% of Chinese wealth is 
concentrated in 20% of China’s families (ibid, 2012). Therefore, philanthropy—“the 
voluntary action for the public good” (Payton & Moody, 2008), which aims for long-term 
development through opportunity creation—can provide some hope for China’s healthy 
economic, political, and societal development. 
The China Context 
Since the late Ming Dynasty, Chinese merchants have given generously through local 
government, trade associations, and benevolent societies (Fuma, 1998; Smith, 2008). 
With the development of China’s market economy, an emerging private business class 
began to give generously through local governments and quasi-government agencies 
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(Dickson, 2003; Shue, 1998; Young, 2002). In a 1995 national survey of 2,870 Chinese 
private entrepreneurs, 87% had given at least something in the past. The median of the 
cumulative contributions was 1,163 USD, with a maximum of 1.3 million USD (Ma & 
Parish, 2006). In 2012, donations from private business amounted to 27.506 billion RMB, 
accounting for 57.98% of all corporate donations (China Economic Times, 2014). 
Moreover, private businesses and entrepreneurs are now recognized with the China 
Philanthropy Award, the top award in philanthropy granted by the Chinese government. 
Chinese private business and entrepreneurs participate in charitable giving through 
the following four major forms (China Economic Times, 2014): a) direct corporate or 
individual giving and aid to the needy organizations and individuals; b) corporate giving 
implemented by an intermediary; c) partnering with charitable organizations through 
project giving and implementation; and d) establishment of their own foundations. Mr. 
Xiaolin Li, Secretary-General of China Siyuan Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, noted, 
Most entrepreneurs and private corporations usually participate in 
philanthropy through direct giving and implementation (i.e. form a), 
however, some entrepreneurs start to shift their corporate and individual 
philanthropic giving from direct giving to establish their own foundations 
(ibid, 2014). 
In fact, the phenomenon of paradigm shift from direct giving to create new 
foundations is also found beyond China. For example, in the United States, foundation 
giving is predicted to increase in 2015 and 2016, according to The Philanthropy Outlook 
2015 & 2016 report (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2015). The 
growth of foundation giving reflects “the growing trend of donors using institutions and 
asset-building giving vehicles” (ibid, p.16, 2015). Concurrently, the Middle East similarly 
witnessed a major shift of direct giving to institutionalizing philanthropy (Cheema, 
2013).  
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This study explores the factors that determine Chinese entrepreneurs’ philanthropic 
behavioral shift from giving to other organizations to establish their own private 
foundations. Owing to a democratic political system, established capitalist market system, 
and dynamic civil society, American philanthropy is becoming more institutionalized, 
professionalized, impact-driven, empirical, and innovative/disruptive (Bishop & Green, 
2008). In contrast, Chinese business people have only just started to engage in the 
conversation, within the past three years, of whether to give and where to give (Fu & 
Song, 2010; Gu, 2013). Some successful entrepreneurs have donated millions to existing 
organizations and government agencies over the years and some recently have shifted to 
start their own charitable foundations. Philanthropic giving has a long history in China, 
but establishing a charitable foundation is still considered a new practice (Heim, 2011). 
Thus, the central question is, “What accounts for the entrepreneurs’ heterogeneous 
responses to conditions of creating foundations?" 
This study proposes an institutional entrepreneurship theoretical perspective to 
examine entrepreneurs’ civic leadership innovation in emerging markets. This perspective, 
which has traditionally been used to examine organizational change and adoption of new 
practices, has been extended to enhance the understanding of individual and 
organizational innovations. 
Building on the institutional entrepreneurship literature, this study posits that 
variations in entrepreneurs’ civic leadership among Chinese entrepreneurs are the result 
of the entrepreneurs’ responses to the ineffectiveness of existing charitable practice and 
social, economical, and political opportunity structures. Specifically, ineffective 
charitable practices for consumer-related industries prompts the change to new feasible 
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ways to assume social responsibilities. After the Red Cross scandal in China (Wong, 
2011), giving to quasi-governmental organizations would not bring desired publicity for 
entrepreneurs; it may paradoxically tarnish their image. I argue that the entrepreneur 
whose business is service-industry oriented is more motivated to establish his or her own 
foundation. Further, in cases where entrepreneurs are not motivated to establish a 
foundation despite ineffective giving results, entrepreneurs’ civic networks may imbue 
civic value. This value highlights independence from government or brings opportunity 
for the entrepreneurs to exchange and incubate new ideas of practicing philanthropy. 
Furthermore, the entrepreneurs’ business products and services intersecting with public 
goods and disadvantaged populations create a strategic business opportunity structure to 
institutionalize their philanthropy. Lastly, if establishing a foundation is consistent with 
the institutional logic of the entrepreneurs’ business headquarters and the entrepreneurs 
have access to the critical resources (e.g., political trust), they will be seen as having 
greater legitimacy and thus elicit less resistance from social and political environment 
and more likely to succeed.  
The empirical context to be used is the current philanthropy institutionalization status 
of the Top 100 Chinese Philanthropists (2004–2010) ranked by Hurun Business Research 
Institute, a research firm specializing in analyzing wealthy Chinese spending behaviors. 
Philanthropy institutionalization is defined as establishment of a private foundation either 
in the name of entrepreneurs’ themselves or a corporation. Western philanthropic 
traditions, from volunteering to foundations creation, had not been common in China 
because the communist ethos and state control of recourses outlawed the accumulation of 
private wealth until 1978. Charitable donations were mainly channeled to the Chinese 
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government or quasi-governmental agencies (McGinnis, 2009). These 
quasi-governmental agencies exist as public foundations. The public foundation is 
eligible to raise funds from the public; whereas the nonpublic foundations may not raise 
funds from the public. Corporate foundations, university foundations, and independent 
foundations are under the nonpublic foundation umbrella (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 
2004). In 2004, the State Council of China adopted the “Regulations on the Management 
of Foundations” (Jijinhui Guanli Tiaoli). Foundations are divided into two major 
categories: public foundations and nonpublic foundations. A public foundation is required 
to spend at least 70% of the previous year’s income on activities for the public good, 
whereas a nonpublic foundation shall spend at least 8% of the previous year’s fund 
balance. All the foundation’s administrative spending is limited to 10% of the 
foundation’s total expenditure for the concerned financial year. The May 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake prompted a huge donation spike in China. Many individuals, corporations, 
and organizations donated to such an extent that 2008 is widely regarded as the first year 
of civic engagement awareness in China (Liu, 2008).  
Philanthropy faces obstacles in China. First of all, entrepreneurs disagree on the 
importance of charitable giving. Some believe that running an effective business is a form 
of charity (China Charity Fair, 2014). Some believe that philanthropy is essential to 
improve themselves and to be an elite in China (Song, 2014). Second, the current 
environment is still hostile to wealthy people. As Yushi Mao, a well-regarded Chinese 
economist, commented, 
Philanthropy couldn't bring the desired reputation, nor safeguard private 
property of the wealthy… because the public disapproves the rich for the 
reason that they are “exploiters” and the entrepreneurs’ wealth remains to 
be potentially confiscated in the lingering “class struggle” (Mao, 2010). 
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Third, the Chinese government has been discouraging the establishment of nonprofit 
organizations—including private foundations—through strict registration requirements 
and little tax deductions. Nonetheless, in recent years the opportunities for Chinese 
entrepreneurs’ philanthropic engagement are burgeoning: In 2013, Chinese government 
further clarified the corporate donations deduction and highlighted its attention to 
improve its current charitable tax deduction and exemption system (Xinua News, 2013). 
Indeed, the institution for establishing private foundations is weak and the 
development of Chinese private foundations is a new phenomenon. The research focusing 
on the philanthropic behavior of Chinese entrepreneurs is limited, although reports and 
studies on private foundations are gaining popularity with scholars (Center on 
Philanthropy, 2012; Estes, 1998; Li, 2010; Liu, 2009; Xu & Wang, 2010). Chinese 
entrepreneurs in the contemporary context are worth studying due to their crucial role in 
building Chinese civil society (Rankin, 1986; Rowe, 1989). Furthermore, there is in 
general a dearth of literature on philanthropy and entrepreneurship. This study contributes 
to the literature on institutional entrepreneurship by examining conditions that contribute 
to the emergence of a new type of organizational form in an emerging market. 
Understanding the entrepreneurs’ heterogeneous responses to conditions of creation 
of foundations will be of significance in the following aspects: First, entrepreneurs in this 
study are high-net-worth people in China. This research will help to understand Chinese 
philanthropic behavior and the context for giving. Second, it will be helpful to capture the 
“new” phenomenon of Chinese philanthropy as well as to lay the groundwork for 
understanding the future behavior of private foundations, a new organizational form in 
China. Third, it will contribute to the understanding of the institutional context that 
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catalyzes entrepreneurial civic leadership. Last, it will help better inform policy-makers 
who promote high-engaged, professional and scientific philanthropy through 
institutionalized philanthropy. This paper consists of seven chapters: Chapter 1 is the 
introduction; Chapter 2 is the literature review; Chapter 3 explains the theoretical 
framework and hypothesis; Chapter 4 delineates the methodology and measurement; data 
analysis is elucidated in the Chapter 5; Chapter 6 interprets the findings; and Chapter 7 
concludes this paper. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This study examines the question, “What accounts for Chinese entrepreneurs’ 
heterogeneous response to institutional philanthropy?” In order to better understand that 
research question, this literature examines as an umbrella theme the creation of 
foundations and entrepreneurs' engagement in philanthropy. A comprehensive literature 
investigation helps couch the current research question within the realm of entrepreneur’s 
philanthropic behavioral studies. Due to China’s relatively short history of private 
business growth, many entrepreneurs are still working as top managers of their company; 
their individual charitable behavior overlaps with their corporate philanthropy. 
Consequently, the literature on an entrepreneur’s individual characteristics and his or her 
corporate philanthropy needs to be examined. Lastly, literature on Chinese 
entrepreneurship and philanthropy is briefly surveyed. 
Creation of Foundations 
Generally, a foundation is an organized form of giving on a large scale and in an 
impactful way. Existing research in philanthropic studies is characterized by inadequate 
systematic study of foundations (Anheier, 2000). Predominantly, it is foundations in 
western countries that are mostly examined, such as the United Kingdom (H.K. Anheier 
& Leat, 2006) and the United States (Renz et al., 1997; Ylvisaker, 1987; Odendahl & 
Sullivan, 1987). The research on the creation of foundations can be approached from 
multiple perspectives:  
• Its roles and contributions (Anheier, 2000) 
• The environment conducive to foundation creation and success 
(Fleishmann, 2007; Odendahl, 1987; Boris, 1987) 
• The motivation of the founder (Breeze & Llyod, 2013; Odendahl, 
1987)  
 12 
Studies show that wealthy people contribute to philanthropy for the following 
reasons (Breeze & Lloyd, 2013; Boris, 1987):  
• They believe in the cause.  
• They want to be a catalyst for change. 
• They feel a responsibility to share their wealth.  
• Philanthropy helps them achieve self-actuation.  
 
However, the reasons for establishing a foundation are mainly strategic, such as 
enabling planned, long-term, tax-efficient giving (Breeze & Lloyd, 2013; Odendahl, 
2013). In addition, other factors are also important, such as the legal environment (e.g., 
regulation, gift deductibility, availability of other charitable alternatives, attorney’s 
recommendation) (Odendahl, 1987), lack of heirs (Boris, 1987), wealthy donor’s stronger 
confidence in nonprofit services than in government (Boris, 1987), donor’s favorable 
perception of foundations as an effective conduit for charitable giving (Boris, 1987), and 
popularization of foundations (Odendahl, 1987; Boris, 1987). 
Explorations of the establishment of foundations by the wealthy have primarily 
focused on the motivation factors using legal or personal attitudinal perspectives. The 
important contextual factor of the wealth-generating activity enabling the creation of the 
foundations remains relatively unexplored. These contextual factors illuminate 
motivations and lay the groundwork for generating insights that may produce predictive 
models. 
Entrepreneurs and Philanthropy 
Schumpeter (1965) defined entrepreneurs as “individuals who exploit market 
opportunities through technical and/or organizational innovation” (p. 46). Bolton and 
Thompson (2000) defined an entrepreneur as “a person who habitually creates and 
innovates to build something of recognized value around perceived opportunities” (p.16). 
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More specifically, Hisrich (1990) defined an entrepreneur as “someone who demonstrates 
initiative and creative thinking, is able to organize social and economic mechanisms to 
turn resources and situations to practical account, and accepts risk and failure” (p.210). 
Thus, an entrepreneur is an individual who recognizes the opportunity of creating or 
innovating, and musters resources to organize and pursue the opportunity. All 
entrepreneurs usually share certain common traits. According to Brandstäter (2011), a 
typical entrepreneur has the following five characteristics:  
Initiating a life of self-determination and independence, finding new 
opportunities and ways of structuring and developing the enterprise, 
(being) hard-working and persistent in goal striving, establishing a social 
network, and taking the risk of failure (p. 223). 
Entrepreneurial philanthropists, according to Harvey et al. (2011), are the 
entrepreneurs who pursue “on a not-for-profit basis of big social objectives through 
active investment of their economic, cultural, social and symbolic resources”(p. 425). 
Economists from the time of Adam Smith have recognized the power of self-interest in 
the creation of wealth as well as the significance of striving for public benefit in 
safeguarding self-interest. The creation of wealth through entrepreneurship and 
redistribution of wealth through philanthropy are distinct characteristics of American 
capitalism (Acs, 2012). However, entrepreneurial philanthropy is not unique to America 
only. Faced by the common challenges that are brought on by globalization and persistent 
economic and health inequalities, the phenomena of entrepreneurial philanthropy now 
goes global. Some terms related to entrepreneurial philanthropy in recent years include: 
venture philanthropy (Letts, Ryan, & Grossman, 1997), creative philanthropy (H.K. 
Anheier & Leat, 2006), enterprising philanthropy (Dees, 2008), and philanthrocapitalism 
(Bishop & Green, 2008). However, entrepreneurial philanthropy has gone beyond the 
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emphasis on novelty, and it is a paradigm that has been in continuous use since the late 
nineteenth century in the U.S. (Harvey et al., 2011). As noted by Taylor, Strom, and Renz 
(2014): 
This topic (entrepreneurs’ engagement in philanthropy) is simple yet 
profound. It requires an understanding of entrepreneurs in their for-profit 
world and an understanding of the world of philanthropy. It entails an 
investigation into the motivations that drive entrepreneurs and 
philanthropists, and the social and political environments that are 
conducive to their success. (p.1) 
The research on entrepreneurs and their engagement in philanthropy is mostly 
ignored and lacks systematic research (Taylor, Strom, & Renz, 2014). An extensive body 
of historical research discloses the wealthy industrialists and their journey to philanthropy, 
such as Carnegie, Rockefeller, Rosenwald, Vanderbilt, Ford, Morgan and Kauffman. 
From the historical angle, the transition from entrepreneurs in the economic realm to 
philanthropists involved in various social issues is a rising area of scholarly research (Acs 
and Phillips, 2002; Taylor et al., 2008; Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014; Harvey et al., 
2011). From Ewing Marion Kauffman to Andrew Carnegie, we see case studies of 19th- 
and 20th-century individuals who revealed their reasons for transitioning from 
entrepreneurs to philanthropists. These reasons include: balancing family wealth transfer 
and giving (Hoy & Rosplock, 2014); building education, continuity and cohesion (Hoy & 
Rosplock, 2014) and leaving a philanthropic legacy (Hoy & Rosplock, 2014); long-term 
investment in America's future; expectation for manifold returns on cultural, social, and 
symbolic capital (Acs & Phillips, 2002); and image enhancement (Acs & Phillips, 2002). 
In contrast, the contemporary young high-tech entrepreneurs’ transfer to philanthropists is 
based on these four reasons: financial security, identity, gratitude, and hyperagency 
(Schervish, 2014). Hyperagency is defined as “the ability to be a producer and a creator 
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of the organizational life of a society rather than a supporter and participant” (ibid, 
p.172). 
Moreover, ample literature examines enduring qualities of entrepreneurial thinking 
fused with philanthropy (Harvey et al., 2011; Carson & Stilwell, 2014; Hoy & Rosplock, 
2014). Entrepreneurs bring to philanthropy the mental models, strategies, tactics, routines, 
and practices learned through creating and building a successful business. They are also 
individuals who are curious, optimistic, and innovative (Carson & Stilwell, 2014). 
Additionally, some research compares and contrasts personal factors that influence 
one’s entrepreneurial and philanthropic propensity (Brush et al., 2014). Research has found 
that gender differences of entrepreneurial propensity are not found in the philanthropist; 
and age, a factor that is negatively correlated to entrepreneurship, is positively correlated 
with philanthropic behaviors. The personal characteristics overlaps include social capital, 
human capital (e.g., education, income), and personal intentions. 
Some other studies are also contingent on the research question, but they focus on the 
motivation for charitable giving of high-net-wealth people (Auten, Clotfelter, & 
Schmalbeck, 2000; Havens & Schervish, 2001; HNW, 2000; Noonan & Rosqueta, 2008; 
Schervish, 2007; Steuerle, 1987), elite social groups (Ostrower, 1995), and high-tech 
entrepreneurs (Schervish, O' Herlihy, Havens, & Social Welfare Research Institute, 2001). 
Research on entrepreneurs’ engagement in philanthropy has yet to be singled out 
sufficiently for special examination. 
Overall, literature concerning entrepreneurs and philanthropy skews toward more 
historical, descriptive understanding of entrepreneurs’ motivation for transitioning to 
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become philanthropists. Existing literature also lacks an understanding of contextual 
factors that account for entrepreneurs’ philanthropic giving. 
Top Managers and Corporate Philanthropy 
Examining literature that studies the decision-makers’ individual determinants of 
corporate philanthropy informs the current study. Specifically, a closer look at the board 
and the CEO’s role in corporate philanthropy will be meaningful to this study, because 
most Chinese business entrepreneurs are still active as CEO or chair of the board in their 
own firm. 
Studies confirm that corporate giving is highly correlated with the high level of 
discretion of top managers/CEOs (Buchholtz, 1999; Geletkanyez & Hambrick, 1997). 
Leaders do play a role in determining companies’ engagement in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). Their leadership style, personality, personal interests, and 
community network are correlated with a company’s CSR. Specifically, a CEO’s 
transformational leadership is positively correlated with the CSR for companies that are 
strategically oriented (Waldman et al., 2006). Charismatic leaders are likely to progress to 
a higher stage of development involving deeply-held personal values and standards, e.g., 
integrity, and maintaining the societal good (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999). The CEO’s board 
membership in a nonprofit and the portion of outside board of directors both influences 
the corporate foundation’ s giving and CSR (Werbel & Carter, 1999; Post, Rahman, & 
Rubow, 2011). 
As is seen above, literature on top managers and corporate philanthropy is dominated 
by the CEO and board members’ leadership characteristics. Yet, the companies’ and 
leaders’ responses to the surrounding external environmental factors have been rarely 
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investigated, which is equally important for understanding the research question of this 
study. 
Chinese Entrepreneurs and Philanthropy 
In spite of the common culture-neutral traits among all entrepreneurs, culture has a 
shaping power on entrepreneurs. Certain cultures can promote or inhibit entrepreneurship. 
Cultures facilitating entrepreneurship score high in individualism, low in uncertainty 
avoidance, low in power distance, and high in masculinity (Hayton et al., 2002). Chinese 
culture, which stresses collectivism and prefers certainties in career choice, is 
fundamentally hostile to entrepreneurship (Wang, 2012; Liao & Sohmen, 2010). Also, 
compared to U.S. entrepreneurs, Chinese entrepreneurs are found to be more likely to 
stress family security, avoidance of conspicuous wealth, and refraining from outward 
recognition of achievement than is the case for their American counterparts (Holt, 1997). 
These understandings of Chinese entrepreneurs serve as the basis of understanding 
Chinese entrepreneurs’ engagement in philanthropy. 
Literature shows Chinese entrepreneurs have taken various forms to engage in 
philanthropy in the course of history. Traditionally, successful Chinese entrepreneurs 
initiated their charity work in their hometown by building schools, constructing roads and 
wells, and providing disaster relief (Koll, 2003, p.13). Since Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), 
benevolent societies, a collective and organized form of charity federation, gained 
popularity among Chinese merchants (Fuma, 1998). In addition, since this time, and 
influenced by the ideas of “democracy” and “science,” business association had become a 
major vehicle for Chinese entrepreneurs’ engagement in benevolent societies (Tsu, 1912; 
Smith, 2008; Fuma, 1998; Dillion, 2011). Not only did entrepreneurs contribute to 
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support the benevolent societies, they also governed the benevolent societies in 
partnership with a group of voluntary elites, including influential literati (gentry), 
officials, and merchants from the local community (Fuma, 1998; Smith, 2008). Moreover, 
they have always been innovative in improving philanthropic practices. For example, 
they introduced scientific principles in practicing their philanthropy in early Republic Era 
by supporting the establishment of western hospitals (Liang, 2013). 
Chinese entrepreneurs’ engagement in philanthropy has been considered an 
important phenomenon for the development of Chinese civil society (Deng & Jing, 1992). 
Chinese civil society has a characteristic of corporatism (Gu, 2004; Zhang, 2008). 
Distinct from state-centered authoritarianism and society-centered pluralism, corporatism 
views the interaction of state and society as an organic whole and emphasizes the 
alignment of interests of both parties (Gu, 2004). In times of economic transition, 
Chinese private entrepreneurs donated generously to government welfare projects and in 
exchange gained political access and social status via appointment to political councils 
(Ma & Parish, 2006). In addition, China’s social and cultural environment, which stresses 
conformity to government (Chen & Tourve, 2012), has shaped Chinese entrepreneurs’ 
philanthropic behavior to be less a “voluntary” action (Fuma, 1998; Chen & Tourve, 2012) 
and more supportive of social and political conformity. The greater economic and social 
conformity indicated by a firm or private entrepreneur, the more likely the owner is to 
become a member of the People’s congress at a higher level (Chen & Tourve, 2012). 
However, not all Chinese entrepreneurs’ philanthropic engagement follows the 
corporatism model. Xiao (2013) and Yang (2012) use an ethnographic approach to 
document and provide insights about the philanthropic involvement of a group of top 
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Chinese entrepreneurs in environmental protection in Inner Mongolia. They contend that 
emerging Chinese entrepreneurs are experimenting with democratic practices through 
philanthropic engagement that include membership in environmental organizations and 
they have created a new space for fertilizing Chinese democracy on a wider scale. 
Chinese private business began growing rapidly only 30 years ago, and many 
corporate owners are still alive and active in corporate decision-making. It is necessary to 
briefly survey the Chinese corporate philanthropy literature to fully understand Chinese 
entrepreneurs’ philanthropic behavior. Studies show that the impact of political 
connection, along with the market mechanism, on corporate donations is strong in China 
(Zhang et al., 2012). An additional three factors that arguably affect the development of 
the Chinese entrepreneur’s philanthropic activities include an entrepreneur 's awareness 
of the alignment of the economic goals and societal goals, company interests and social 
cognition, and the religious and traditional culture that entrepreneurs experience from 
birth (Zhao, Bai, &Zhao, 2014). 
With the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, entrepreneurs are faced with 
unprecedented opportunities and responsibilities to improve the country and the world. 
Coming from different family backgrounds and success trajectories, Chinese 
entrepreneurs are a heterogeneous group embracing different ambitions and values. The 
existing literature on Chinese entrepreneurs informs the understanding of their 
philanthropic behaviors, but overlooks the examination of the new philanthropic 
phenomenon among the Chinese entrepreneurs, i.e. creation of foundations. 
In sum, a review of the entrepreneurial philanthropy literature reveals that beyond the 
work of a handful of researchers, philanthropic activities undertaken by entrepreneurs 
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have been afforded little attention. The existing literature on the creation of foundations, 
on entrepreneurs and philanthropy, and on top managers and corporate social 
responsibility reveals that the contextual factors illuminating the motivations of Chinese 
entrepreneurs’ engagement in philanthropy are inadequately examined. Also, empirical 
studies are largely absent in the aforementioned research realms. Meanwhile, literature on 
Chinese entrepreneurs and philanthropy has mostly focused on charitable giving, and 
research dedicated to examining the creation of foundations is virtually nonexistent. 
In an attempt to address the above literature gaps, this study explores the social and 
economic conditions that may lead entrepreneurs to create their foundations, a behavior 
shift from unorganized giving to creation of a foundation, a shift from an old mode of 
giving to a new mode of giving. 
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Chapter 3: Theory and Hypotheses 
Institutional Entrepreneurship 
As shown in the aforementioned literature reviews, studies and theories are limited in 
explaining entrepreneurs’ heterogeneous responses to institutional philanthropy, 
especially the conditions of creation of foundations from economic and societal 
environment perspectives. This paper examines factors that account for the behavioral 
change (from unorganized giving to creation of foundations) under the institutional 
entrepreneurship theoretical framework. 
Institutional entrepreneurship evolves from institutional theory, which emphasizes 
the influence of the environment on organizations. Institutionalism holds organizations to 
not only serve their rational goals but also serve some institutions (Selznick, 1966). With 
the increased focus on external institutions such as the state, social norms, traditions, and 
conventions, along with imitation in shaping organizational practices, 
neo-institutionalism highlights the external institutional forces exerted on organizations. 
In the search for legitimacy and social acceptance, organizations try to align their actions, 
structures, and practices with the pattern held to be socially correct (Scott & Meyer, 
1991). Legitimacy is “a generalized perception of supposition that actions of an entity are 
desired” (Suchman, 1995, p. 4). Expanding the idea of conformity for legitimacy, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) coined the term isomorphism to analyze organizational 
homogenization. Isomorphism is a process that organizations develop similar 
organizational structures, processes, and cultures in response to environmental pressures. 
Institutional theorists viewed institutions as external environmental constraints on human 
agency; however, the passive view of agency in adapting to environment is only one side 
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of the coin. Agency and institutions have a dialectical relationship. On the one hand, 
institutions shape the agency; on the other hand, it is the agency that creates the 
institutions, or the institution is the product of human agency (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991). 
Definition of Institutional Entrepreneurship 
The early/old institutionalism actually accounts for active agency. For example, 
Selznick (1957) emphasizes the role of human agency in creating institutions by 
analyzing the role of leaders in the institutional process. DiMaggio (1998) is the first 
person to introduce the notion of institutional entrepreneurship into institutional theory. 
He defined institutional entrepreneurs as actors who have an interest in modifying 
institutional structures or in creating new ones, and who have enough resources to do so 
(DiMaggio, 1988). Institutions are commonly defined as “rules, norms, and beliefs that 
describe reality for the organization, explaining what is and is not, what can be acted 
upon and what cannot” (Hoffman, 1999, p. 351). Entrepreneurship, from a sociological 
perspective, means change associated with deviations from some norm (Garud & Karnøe, 
2001). In Eisenstadt (1964)’s work, institutional entrepreneurs are individuals or groups 
who serve as leaders in institution building. Active roles for actors and agency are 
emphasized in the institutional change process. Institutional entrepreneurship refers to 
“activities of actors who have interest in particular institutional arrangements and who 
leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones” (Maguire, 
Hardy and Lawrence, 2004, p.657). Not all change makers are institutional entrepreneurs. 
Only actors who initiated and implemented divergent changes within a given institutional 
context by breaking with the institutional logic can be regarded as institutional 
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entrepreneurs (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). In 
other words, institutional entrepreneurship emerges within the boundaries of an 
organization within the broader institutional context in which an actor is embedded. 
Examples of Institutional Entrepreneurship 
The following is a concrete illustration of the above-mentioned definition of 
institutional entrepreneurs. Traditionally, the U.S. mutual fund industry has been 
dominated by passive money-management practices, i.e. preservation of wealth and 
conservative investment strategies. Within this milieu, some money managers began to 
create variations among “conservative” funds by promoting active money-management 
strategies, thus qualifying as institutional entrepreneurs (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007) 
because the new practice of active money management, which also became 
institutionalized later on, deviated from the dominant institutionalized template of passive 
money management in the U.S. In contrast, a money manager who initiates a change 
project aimed at preserving wealth is not an institutional entrepreneur. The reason is that 
such change is aligned with the dominant institutional logic of wealth management in the 
U.S. mutual fund industry. 
The introduction of a new model of managing human resources in U.S. law firms in 
the early 1980s is another example of institutional entrepreneurship (Sherer & Lee, 2002). 
The standard model for human resource management at U.S. law firms in much of the 
20th century was the Cravath model, which essentially was an “up-or-out” system. 
Lawyers were placed on a partner tracker and moved up to the position of partner or out 
of the firm after six years. 
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In 1982, the New York law firm Davis, Polka and Wardell broke with the Cravath 
model and created a track for associates who did not make partners within a given 
timeframe. The law firm, by initiating a change that deviated from the institutionalized 
model for managing lawyers, effectively acted as an institutional entrepreneur. 
Characteristics of Institutional Entrepreneurs 
Furthermore, “New institutions arise…. When organized actors with sufficient 
resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly” 
(DiMaggio, 1988, p.14). Institutional entrepreneurs’ intentionality with regard to change, 
and the success of their change, are not the necessary conditions for identifying an 
institutional entrepreneurship. Creation of a new venture or organizational form does not 
necessarily qualify as an actor in institutional entrepreneurship. Rather it is the act of 
initiating deviated change from the dominant institutional context that defines the 
institutional entrepreneurship. The defining character of institutional entrepreneurs is 
duality, namely structure and agency. They are confined or constrained by the structure or 
the preexisting institutional environment (structure), yet they generate entrepreneurial 
activities (agency) based on the structure and try to break through the old structure and 
modify or create a new structure. Through the interplay of habits, reflection, and 
judgment, the institutional entrepreneurs “reproduce and transform those structures in 
interactive response to the problems posed by the changing historical situations” (see 
Garud, Hardy, Maguire, 2007, p. 10). The innovation of institutional entrepreneur creates 
externalities outside of the organization. A business entrepreneur in China, where the 
market institutions were being established in the late 1990s and early 2000s, was 
considered an institutional entrepreneur (Li, Feng, & Jiang, 2005). This is because these 
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entrepreneurs created their business ventures despite various institutional barriers (such 
as entry restrictions and excessive intervention) by breaking the existing bureaucratic 
rules and pushing for the establishment of a sound market institution. All in all, to qualify 
as institutional entrepreneurs, individuals must break with existing dominant institutional 
rules and practices and institutionalize the alternative rules, practices, or logics they are 
championing (Battilana, 2006). 
On the whole, institutional entrepreneurs are characterized by three major qualities: 
• They are knowledgeable, which allows them to produce or reproduce 
a new institution. 
• They have resources at their disposal to enable them to influence the 
institutionalized rules (DiMaggio, 1988). 
• They possess social skills that enable them to motivate others to 
support their initiative (Fligstein, 1997). 
 
A Holistic Perspective of Viewing Institutional Entrepreneurship in the  
Institutionalization Process 
As mentioned earlier, institutional entrepreneurship theory evolves from institutional 
theory and addresses the limitation of institutionalism. The limitation of institutionalism 
lies in its emphasis on compliance, conformity, and isomorphism but overlooks the 
proactive role of an agent to innovate and change (organizational) structure. Institutional 
entrepreneurship theorists explore how actors shape emerging institutions and transform 
existing ones despite the complexities and path dependences that are involved (Garud, 
Hardy, Maguire, 2007). 
Institutional entrepreneurs are embedded in an old system and try to construct a new 
system based on their understanding and evaluation of the old system. Institutional 
entrepreneurship theory emphasizes the process of a new practice of construct prior to 
being popularly adopted and diffused. Institutionalization is not a simple, systematic, 
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linear process. Institutionalization is a result of institutional entrepreneurship, and the 
deinstitutionalization dimension of such entrepreneurship can also be the result of fixing 
the problem of institutionalization. As a process, institutionalization reflects the relative 
power of organized interests and actors who mobilize them. Deinstitutionalization and 
reconstruction, a role that the institutional entrepreneurs play, leads to a new institution 
diffusion and institutionalization after theorization and legitimation (Greenwood, 
Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002). 
 
Figure 1. Institutionalization in circular perspective. 
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Institutional Change and Institutional Entrepreneurship 
Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) define institutional change as “a difference in form, 
quality, or state over time in an institution”(p. 866). As observed by Hargrave and Van de 
Ven (ibid, 2006), “institutional change can be determined by observing the arrangement 
at two or more points in time on a set of dimensions (e.g. frames, norms, rules) and then 
calculating the differences over time in these dimensions.” An institutional change can be 
viewed from four dimensions: institutional design, institutional adaptation, institutional 
diffusion, and collective action (ibid, 2006). The institutional adaptation and institutional 
diffusion models focus on the conformity of individual organization and organization 
fields due to the regulative and normative environment. In contrast, the institutional 
design dimension focuses on the intentional behaviors of an individual entrepreneur in 
the creation or revision of an existing institution to achieve one’s desired goals. Thus, the 
institutional arrangement reflects “the pursuit of conscious choices” (Hargrave and Van 
de Ven, 2006, p. 867). Similarly, the collective action model focuses on the institutional 
innovation as a result of interaction of interdependent partisan agents. Both the individual 
and the groups of embedded partisan actors can be institutional entrepreneurs. 
Deinstitutionalization and reconstruction is the role that the institutional entrepreneurs 
play. Table 1 illustrates institutional change dimensions. 
Table 1. Mode of Change 
 Construction Reproduction 
Multiple actors in  
interorganizational field 
Collective action Individual diffusion 
Single actor Institutional design Institutional adaptation 
Note: From Zahir-ul-Hassan and Vosselman (2006) 
From the mode of change diagram, it is reasonable to consider the possibility of 
change as a result of institutional adaption and diffusion. The institutional entrepreneur is 
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just one of the change agents. Not all change agents are institutional entrepreneurs. Only 
the actor who initiated a deviated change in a dominant institutional context can be 
regarded as institutional entrepreneurs. Institutional changes occur as the result of an 
interaction between the contextual factors and intra-organizational dynamics (such as 
interest, values, power dependencies, and capacity for action) (Greenwood and Hinings 
(1996). Institutional entrepreneurs play an important role in such an interaction (Garud et 
al., 2007). The change of cultural, political, social, and legal context provides pressures or 
understandings for institutional change (Oliver, 1992); however, the discourse does not 
determine its final change. The macro-level environmental changes provide legitimacy or 
building blocks for new institutional fields, but how the building blocks are used to 
construct a field depends upon the local actor’s choices (Lawrence & Phllips, 2004). 
Introducing Institutional Entrepreneurship Theory to Philanthropic Studies 
Garud, Hardy, and Maguire (2007) argue that institutional entrepreneurship theory 
offers considerable promise for understanding how and why certain novel organizing 
solutions—new practices or new organizational forms, for example—come into existence 
and become well established over time. Institutional entrepreneurship theory is widely 
adopted to examine the innovation and creation of practices and organizational 
management, industry, social movement, and the like. The key two aspects of 
institutional entrepreneurship include the following: 
• How one becomes an institutional entrepreneur while being embedded 
in an established institution (Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007; Seo & 
Creed, 2002; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) 
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• How the divergent changes are implemented (Fligstein, 2001; 
Greenwood et al., 2002; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005) 
 
How will the application of theory be applied to the research question, which 
analyzes the behavioral shift of Chinese entrepreneurs’ philanthropic giving mode from 
direct giving to the creation of foundations? The research question of this paper is related 
to the enabling conditions of institutional entrepreneurship, i.e. how institutional 
entrepreneurs emerge despite institutional pressures. In the case of the Chinese 
entrepreneurs’ philanthropic giving practices, direct giving to government agencies, 
quasi-government organizations, existing charitable organizations, and disadvantaged 
individuals serve as a dominant institutional logic for charitable giving in China. 
Moreover, Chinese entrepreneurs tend to conform to government (Chen & Tourve, 2012) 
and hesitate to expose their affluence to the public (Mao, 2010). All these institutions 
exert strong influence on Chinese entrepreneurs and prevent them from establishing their 
own foundations that oftentimes are considered as independence-seeking from 
government in the discourse of civil society. Although Chinese entrepreneurs have to bear 
extra risks and burdens to establish a foundation compared to their counterparts in a 
codified civil society, these institutional constraints faced by Chinese entrepreneurs also 
provides opportunity for them to break through the old institutions and establish a new 
institution toward an organized philanthropy. Such embeddedness of Chinese 
entrepreneurs could potentially influence their intent to change and make them an 
institutional entrepreneur. 
No private foundations were established until 2004 when the Regulations on 
Foundation Administration were enacted. The Regulations seemed to open up more space 
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for civil society and may have motivated entrepreneurs to establish foundations, but it 
also constrains the growth of foundations due to tight control on registration, interference 
of governance, and ambiguity and uncertainty of regulation implementation and 
supervision (He, 2006). The establishment of private foundations is a novel 
organizational solution for philanthropic giving that breaks with the dominant 
institutional logic (i.e. direct giving) despite all the institutional ambiguities. Because this 
paper examines factors that account for the agency for Chinese entrepreneurs who change 
their strategy of giving and initiate the establishment of their foundations at 
organizational level, the institutional entrepreneurship theory can be applied to explain 
this new phenomenon. 
 The application of institutional entrepreneurship in understanding donor behaviors 
and motivations is rare in the extant research literature. The introduction of such theory 
can contribute to the expansion of philanthropic studies theory building. Moreover, the 
study of philanthropy is positioned to educate leaders (Burlingame, 2006), and exploring 
theories on understanding and catalyzing change is of significance to the cultivation of 
future leaders. 
In addition, China, as one of the top emerging economies, provides great context for 
testing and improving the institutional entrepreneurship theory. The reasons are as 
follows: first, China has witnessed lots of social innovations and transitions, especially in 
philanthropic areas, followed by its economic success. The number of private foundations 
has grown significantly since 2004, when there were 892 registered public foundations 
and no private foundations. During the five years following the issuing of the Regulations 
on Foundation Administration in 2004, the number of Chinese private foundations 
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boomed from 202 in 2005 to 342 in 2006, 443 in 2007, 643 in 2008, and 846 in 2009. As 
of April 21, 2013, there are 3,120 foundations in total, among which 1,344 public 
foundations, and 1766, private foundations. It is obviously seen that the birth and growth 
of private foundations in China is a novel practice and becoming well established over 
time. As stated earlier, institutional entrepreneurship offers promise for understanding 
how and why certain novel practices come into existence and become institutionalized 
gradually. Second, China’s existing tradition of charitable giving, authoritarism political 
system, and policy constraints (such as dual-registration requirement, 10% cap 
administration fee, and limited tax incentive) create institutional barriers for 
philanthropists to create a private foundation. The entrepreneurial philanthropists not only 
play role of traditional entrepreneurs in the Schumpeterian sense, but also help break the 
old institutions of giving and help establish a new mode of philanthropic institutions in 
the process of their giving. The traditional sense of entrepreneurship cannot capture the 
challenges and endeavors of these institutional entrepreneurs, because they face 
additional challenges in navigating an imperfect charitable and social management 
system. Therefore, China is an appropriate context for testing the institutional 
entrepreneurship theory. 
Moreover, China is different from other contexts that have been used for the 
development of institutional entrepreneurship, because it is a place that fully introduces 
“agency, interest, and power” (Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007, p.2) into institutional 
analysis. Chinese philanthropists must possess skills beyond those of traditional Chinese 
philanthropists or philanthropists from western countries where professional and 
organized philanthropy is an established practice. Instead, they have to deal with 
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government officials who try to limit the ability of civil society and public opinions that 
hold hostility for the rich. These philanthropists are institutional entrepreneurs that face 
more risks than their counterpart of a mature codified civil society. More interestingly, 
China is well known for its people’s conformity, but what makes them push for an 
independent and organized mode of giving rather than being submissive to the imperfect 
environment? As an emerging market, China is a unique place to understand the 
mechanism that makes the change work. 
Hypotheses 
As discussed above, the research question is concerned with enabling conditions of 
institutional entrepreneurship. The enabling conditions that are identified range from 
characteristics of actors to characteristics of environments in which they are embedded 
(Battinala, Leca, and Boxenbaum, 2009), including conflicts between the current 
situation and adapted practices, heterogeneous social networks and strategic intersections 
between business and public welfares, supportive institutional logic, and power. The 
following hypotheses are proposed with a focus on the aforementioned institutional and 
individual characteristics. 
Institutional Contradiction 
A contradiction can be defined as a pair of features that together produce an unstable 
tension in a given system (Blackburn, 1994). Seo and Creed (2002) explained that 
institutional contradictions lead embedded agents to take collective action to bring about 
institutional change. The institutional contradictions can come from four different sources, 
including a) the legitimacy that undermines the functional inefficiency; b) adaptation that 
undermines adaptability; c) intrainstitutional conformity that creates interinstitutional 
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incompatibilities; and d) isomorphism that conflicts with divergent interests (ibid, 2002). 
The institutional theorists contend that organizations are embedded in pluralistic 
institutional environments that are often imbued with sharply inconsistent prescriptions 
for actions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Thus, organizations sometimes tend to incorporate 
all sorts of incompatible and conflicting practices and procedures in the search for 
legitimacy, survival, and stability. Seo and Creed summarized, 
Individuals and organizations that are increasingly exposed to multiple 
and contradictory yet interconnected, institutional arrangements and 
prescriptions—all of which are the inevitable by-product of the ongoing 
social construction of those institutions (2002, p. 228). 
Firms that are more influenced by consumers (i.e. the extent to which a firm’s 
business is open and vulnerable to its social environment) are more likely to have 
corporate giving programs that aim to meet a variety of stakeholder expectations (Saiia, 
Caroll, & Buchholtz, 2003). The Chinese consumer-related industries, defined as 
industries where firms sell directly to individual consumers, have a stronger motivation to 
be recognized by government and the public and therefore may donate more (Fye et al. 
1982; Ma & Parish, 2004). The 2008 Sichuan earthquake witnessed a peak of Chinese 
philanthropic donations, but the Red Cross scandal in China put the governmental 
charities under extreme public criticism and degradation (Wong, 2011), thus, the Chinese 
public’s expectation and legitimacy—granting has been increasingly diverted from 
government legitimacy—granting. The former favors companies that donate to more 
transparent civil charitable organizations; whereas, the latter still demands a company’s 
conformity with donation to government-run charities. Although entrepreneurs may 
choose to donate to civil or grassroots charitable organizations, the culture of pursuit of 
power and conformity to the state, along with the state’s denial of legitimacy of the 
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grassroots organizations (Saich, 1999), prevents most entrepreneurs from engaging with 
civil and grassroots organizations. Chinese entrepreneurs now turn to operating charitable 
projects by their own company or foundation. 
Thus, the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Chinese entrepreneurs whose businesses have been involved 
in more consumer-related industries are more likely to establish a corporate-type 
foundation than those whose business are less consumer-related. 
Contrary to the institutional contradiction observation, if the legitimacy and 
adaptation from the institution continues to contribute to efficiency and adaptability, it 
frustrates the potential for change. Odendahl (1987) found that the availability of 
donor-advised funds of the wealthy donors decreased the likelihood of a wealthy donor’s 
creation of a foundation. Similarly, if the Chinese entrepreneurs have established 
donor-advised funds under the Charity Federation (a quasi-governmental public 
foundation), and it still serves their purposes well in carrying out their social 
responsibilities, the likelihood of shifting to establishment of foundations is low. Thus, 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Chinese entrepreneurs who have established a donor-advised 
fund are less likely to establish a foundation sooner than those who have not had a 
donor-advised fund. 
Institutional Heterogeneity 
Battilana (2004) goes beyond the institutional contradiction and starts with a 
multidimensional definition of agency. She conceptualizes agency as a temporally 
embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its habitual aspect), but 
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also oriented towards the future (as a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and 
towards the present (as a capacity to contextualize past habits and future projects within 
the contingencies of the moment) (ibid, p.11). 
Drawing on Gidden’s structuration theory, Battinala (2004) concludes that the 
heterogeneous environment accounts for the agency. The heterogeneous environment will 
present an opportunity for the agent to be more conscious and critical in evaluating those 
arrangements. Especially, when the agent is embedded with a multiple-institutional field, 
he or she has more knowledge about those arrangements. Chinese entrepreneurs are 
greatly motivated to connect with political and quasi-governmental social networks for 
the purpose of establishing organizational legitimacy under a hostile institutional 
environment in the transitional economy (Yueh, 2008; Feng & Wang, 2009). In the past 
two decades, Chinese government has been chiefly encouraging entrepreneurs to make 
charitable contributions through government agencies or quasi-government agencies 
(Hurun Research Institute, 2013) to advance government’s societal development agenda 
(Ma & Parish, 2006). In contrast, civil society organizations, such as private foundations, 
encourage independence and diversity. Being exposed to civil nonprofit organizations, 
Chinese entrepreneurs are exposed to new ideas of practicing philanthropy and cultivated 
to embrace democracy (Yang, 2012; Xiao, 2013). 
Thus the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Chinese entrepreneurs, who have been involved in civil 
nonprofit organizations, are more likely to establish foundations than those who are 
only connected with governmental or quasi-governmental organizations. 
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Battinala (2004) further points out that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between the likelihood that an actor will become an institutional entrepreneur and the 
degree of interinstitutional heterogeneity between the focal organizational field and the 
other organizational fields this actor knows about. Actors who are at the intersection of 
related organizational fields usually see the strategic position that is highly likely to 
impact their agentic orientation. A study by Husted, Allen, and Rivera (2010) confirm 
such strategic position- taking. They state that the higher the centrality of CSR activities 
to the firms’ mission, the more likely that the firms will engage in CSR internally. CSR 
activities in areas closely related to the core business of the firm are usually internalized 
because of the greater competence of the firm and thus the greater ability to monitor 
recipients through its administrative control system. A corporate foundation, which is 
established by the company and construes the majority of its board with the company’s 
internal staff, is an important tool and representation to internalize its CSR activities. 
Moreover, when the entrepreneurs’ business intersecting with public welfares, the more 
they are committed to public welfares, the more shared values they create for themselves 
and the public, and the more strategic their CSR activities are. 
Thus, the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Chinese entrepreneurs, whose core business industry intersects 
more with the public welfare, are more likely to establish a corporate type of 
foundation than those whose industries do not intersect. 
Institutional Logic 
The changing environment of the actor causes the poor adaptation of the actor in a 
new environment and drives the actor to change (Oliver, 1992). The environmental 
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pressures exert significant influences on the actor’s agency as well as on the actor’s 
isomorphism. When the environment, especially the regulatory or social normative 
environment, changes, the actor is prompted to question the status quo legitimacy (Oliver, 
1992). In order to establish a new legitimacy, institutional entrepreneurs emerge. Chinese 
society is highly government-driven (Chen and Touve, 2011). Feng and Wang (2010) 
examined the institutional environment faced by Chinese entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs 
are frequently asked to donate or contribute to government welfare. The legitimacy is 
established through political connection to and conformity with government. Therefore, 
the government’s nod to philanthropy is very important for creating a foundation. More 
importantly, the local government’s institutional logic may provide some indication of 
what constitutes a reasonable contribution by a philanthropist.  
Thus, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Chinese entrepreneurs whose businesses are headquartered in 
a location where philanthropic giving is encouraged through regulatory and social 
environments are more likely to establish foundations than those who are based in a 
location where philanthropy is not actively promoted.  
Power and Legitimacy 
Private entrepreneurs were formally permitted to join the China Communist Party 
(CCP) in 2001, and more private entrepreneurs are included in the political elite system. 
In China, membership in the People’s Congress (PC) or Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) usually offers entrepreneurs the opportunity to know 
those government officials and gain the trust of the government. Thus, membership not 
only gives them some level of political power but also makes it easier for them to 
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cultivate formal and informal ties with important government bureaucrats who can lower 
the barriers to the establishment of foundations. Although China has witnessed growth in 
philanthropy in recent years, the Chinese government is still cautious and mindful about 
the growth of Chinese private philanthropy. In most provinces, foundation registration 
still requires a government agency as a sponsor. Only a few provinces are open to 
test-pilot the philanthropic promotion. Yang (2012), a top civil public foundation leader, 
confirms that tensions between government and private foundations exist, and 
government is very cautious in approving public and private foundations. Chinese 
entrepreneurs who are in the higher echelon of the political party are more easily trusted 
by the government and are afforded more legitimacy. In addition, their political position 
at the level of elite decision-making reduces their own uncertainty or vulnerability about 
a new institution. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): Chinese entrepreneurs who are in the higher political 
echelons are more likely to establish a foundation than those who are not in the 
system. 
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): Chinese entrepreneurs who joined the political echelons 
earlier are likely to establish a foundation sooner than those who joined the CPC or 
CPPCC later.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology and Measurement 
Sample and Data Collection 
The unit of analysis is the individual Chinese entrepreneur with significant donations 
since 2003. The reason for choosing this period of time is because the regulation of 
Chinese foundations came into effect in 2004. The regulations set the policy for private 
individuals establishing private foundations. Thus, it is helpful to track from 2003 as the 
point from which significant donations had been made but the regulations on foundations 
had not yet started. If we track from 2004, the government policy may become a key 
influencer on an entrepreneur’s institutionalization activities. The subjects of this study 
are Chinese entrepreneurs who were born and/or raised in Mainland China. Entrepreneurs 
who were born and raised in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan or overseas are not 
included, because they have been exposed to business, social, and legal environments 
distinct from Mainland Chinese entrepreneurs. The sampling frame is mainly drawn from 
the Hurun Top 100 Philanthropists ranking list from 2004 to 2011, which tracked 
entrepreneurs’ donation activity starting from 2003. 
In fact, several ranking lists are dedicated to the philanthropic donations of Chinese 
wealthy people. Table 2 below is a brief comparison of the major recognized 
philanthropists ranking lists in China. 
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Table 2. Comparison of Major Ranking List 
  Top 100 
Philanthropists 
Chinese 
Philanthropists List 
100 Most  
Generous Donors 
China Charity 
Ranking 
Research entity   Hurun Research 
Institute 
Forbes China 
Research 
China Philanthropy 
Research Institute 
China Nonprofit 
Times 
Type of 
organization   
Business Business Academic Quasi-governmental 
Targeted 
philanthropists   
Mainland Chinese 
entrepreneurs* 
Mainland Chinese 
private corporations 
Mainland Chinese 
high-net-worth or 
nonstate company’s 
major shareholders 
Mainland Chinese 
corporations and 
individuals 
Beginning of 
ranking   
2004 2005 2011 2004 
Donation tracking 
periods 
2003–present 2004–present except 
2006 and 2007 
2011 2003–present 
Selection criteria  Cash, in-kind Cash Cash, or 
cash-equivalent 
securities, pledge 
 
 
 
 
Cash and 
cash-equivalent 
Data sources Survey, news press, 
experts, 
philanthropists, 
foundations archives 
China Nonprofit 
Times, Forbes China 
Research, 
Commission of 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility of 
China Social Work 
Association at 
Ministry of Civil 
Affairs 
News release, donation 
receipt organizations, 
company website 
Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, donors, 
recipient charitable 
organizations, 
annual report from 
public listed 
companies, press 
release, China 
Nonprofit Times 
Entry donation 
amount  
3 million RMB or 
more 
1 million RMB or 
more 
- 1 million RMB or 
more 
Note. *Corporate donations are counted toward the entrepreneurs’ personal donations if 
the Chinese entrepreneur owns a share of 50% or more. 
 
Through comparison, it is clear that the Hurun Top 100 Philanthropists list tracks 
over a longer period Chinese entrepreneurs’ donations activity; in addition, its major 
subjects reflect this study’s population. Although the China Charity Ranking conducted 
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by China Nonprofit Times is comparable with the Hurun list, its targeted populations 
include more than entrepreneurs. Admittedly, discrepancy exists among the different 
ranking lists due to the challenges of data collection (Jinghua Daily, 2011). For instance, 
the Forbes China Research team even suspended its philanthropy ranking list in 2007 and 
2008, stating that “Chinese entrepreneurs are too private about their charitable donations 
to collect data”（China Daily, 2007). Moreover, “more than half of the philanthropists 
contribute directly to donor-advised funds or earmarked organizations. This increases the 
difficulty of data collection. Many more entrepreneurs’ donations are not captured on this 
list”（ibid, 2007), said Rupert Hoogewerf, the founder of Hurun Research Institute. 
Different research institutions examine wealthy entrepreneurs’ donations from different 
sources, and “it is hard to be 100% accurate,” commented Dr. Deng Guosheng, a 
well-known scholar on nonprofit studies from Tsing Hua University (ibid, 2007). 
The 2004–2013 Hurun Top 100 Philanthropists list consists of 381 distinct 
entrepreneurs. Due to time and resource constraints, this research only selects 
entrepreneurs from the 2004–2011 Hurun Philanthropist List and examines whether they 
have created their foundation as of 2014 and the corresponding time of establishment. An 
initial total of 246 entrepreneurs were generated from the 2004–2011 lists. A database 
based on the selected entrepreneurs through multiple data collection methods was 
compiled, details of which will be described further below. After the first round of data 
collection, the researcher removed the listed entrepreneurs who are part of Chinese 
diaspora and whose company website was not available. Entrepreneurs who haven’t 
established a foundation as of October 2014 and have been reported to have gone 
bankrupt or arrested were also eliminated from the list. Since the starting year (t0) is 2003, 
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entrepreneurs who established a foundation in 2003 or before are excluded from the list. 
The final total sample of this study is 209 entrepreneurs. This sample includes 
well-renowned entrepreneurs such as Cao Dewang, the Chinese glass tycoon; Chen 
Guangbiao, the Chinese tycoon who offered to buy The New York Times; and Niu 
Gengsheng, founder of the Chinese dairy giant Mengniu Dairy. Because these 
megaphilanthropists are capable of creating their foundations, given the multimillion 
donations that have been contributed, they are considered to be appropriate for this study. 
All the research subjects were carefully identified, documented, and managed 
throughout the whole data collection process. A detailed data management plan was 
created before the data collection. All the variables are carefully defined, and a pilot 
research effort was conducted to test definitions and check the variation of the variable 
definitions. 
Data collection took place in two stages. At stage one, the researcher collected 
information about entrepreneurs’ business industry and company information through 
their company website, annual reports, media releases, various company ranking lists, 
and industry yellow books. Entrepreneurs’ civil services and membership information 
were collected through their member organizations, their public Wikipedia page, 
company website, and media releases. Entrepreneurs’ political status and year of joining 
the political membership was obtained through their public Wikipedia page, and local and 
national People’s Congress and/or Political Consultative Committee. Entrepreneurs’ 
personal information was chiefly collected through Hurun’s Rich List, Forbes Rich List, 
Top 3,000 Chinese Family-owned Corporations, personal Wikipedia pages, and company 
websites. Moreover, the institutional logic score information was collected through 
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Ministry of Civil Affairs. A list of variables, definitions, and data sources is described in 
Appendix A. 
At stage two, the researcher made phone calls to the company to crosscheck multiple 
resources to ensure consistency and accuracy. The researcher first collected contact 
information through the entrepreneur’s company website. Then, the researcher faxed a 
letter of introduction indicating the purpose of the study and expected follow-ups. In 
addition, to increase the credibility of the researcher and thus to increase the response rate 
of the telephone survey, a letter was issued by the sponsor institute—the Song Chingling 
Education Center on Philanthropy at Beijing Normal University Zhuhai, where the 
researcher was an adjunct faculty member. The data were verified mainly through the key 
informants of the company, such as manager of President’ s Office or Public Relations 
Department. About one third of the sample was obtained and verified. A detailed data 
verification questionnaire for the telephone interview is attached in Appendix B. 
Information on whether entrepreneurs had established their own foundation is 
identified with reference to the China Foundation Center’s (CFC) database. The CFC 
claims to have the fullest data set on Chinese foundations. Criteria that were used to 
identify the private foundations include the following: a) private foundation, denoting the 
foundation does raise money from public funds and the private party is responsible for 
the operation and governance; b) primarily initiated by a business entrepreneur; c) is 
primarily funded by a business entrepreneur; d) the foundation carries the individual 
entrepreneur’s name; e) the foundation doesn’t carry the individual entrepreneur's name 
but represents a social cause indicating the donor’s intent; f ) the foundation carries the 
corporate name in which the donor has majority share holdings; g) the entrepreneur had 
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made donations prior to establishing the foundation. (This is to identify the entrepreneur 
as an agent, one who changes from previous sporadic giving to organized giving.) These 
foundations are usually organized according to the following categories: family 
foundation, corporate foundation, and independent foundation. Each is categorized, 
respectively, in the CFC’s database. The researcher reviewed all types of foundations 
contained in the CFC database and cross referenced with the sample to the Hurun Top 
100 Philanthropist List. 
Furthermore, the researcher also referred to press releases, company websites, and 
company annual reports to identify whether the entrepreneur, or the company which the 
entrepreneur has the majority holdings, had established a foundation. Additionally, the 
researcher also consulted experts from China Foundation Center to review the accuracy 
of information about the establishment of a given foundation by entrepreneurs and their 
companies. 
Dependent Variable (y) 
I examine the antecedents of Chinese entrepreneurs’ shifting philanthropic donation 
behavior from direct giving to creation of foundations. The dependent variable (y) is the 
hazard rate of an entrepreneur’s establishment of their foundations: at any given time, 
each entrepreneur in the “risk set” (entrepreneurs who have not established foundations) 
faces some underlying “risk” that he/she will establish a foundation. In the sample, the 
209 top Chinese entrepreneurs made donations from 2004–2013 in either their own name 
or corporate name. Among them, 53 entrepreneurs established at least one foundation 
primarily funded by them. Other entrepreneurs have donated significantly to other 
organizations (more than 3 million RMB accumulatively), but have never established 
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their own foundation. The study will measure the number of years from 2004 to when the 
entrepreneurs establish their own foundation. 
Independent Variable (x) 
Number of consumer-related industry (X1): the China National Statistical Bureau 
(2013) divides the Chinese economy into three major industries: the first industry 
includes agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing; the second industry includes mining, 
manufacturing, constructing, heating, gas and water provision; the third industry is the 
service industry, which includes all the industries that fall beyond the first and second 
industry group. The service industry embraces a wide range of activities, such as 
wholesale, transportation, hotel, dining, information technology service, finance, 
insurance, real estate, etc. In this study, the consumer-related industry is measured by its 
service nature. Big entrepreneurs are usually involved in multiple industries. If the 
entrepreneur’s industry has no service industry, it was recorded as 0; if he or she does, the 
number of the service industry was recorded. This variable is a time-constant variable. 
Whether established a fund (X2): As is the case for donor-advised funds in the United 
States, Chinese donor-advised funds are also a philanthropic vehicle associated with a 
public foundation, usually at local Charity Federations. It is not an institutional donation, 
but it entrusts the public foundation to invest the donation, identify the charitable 
project(s), and distribute the investment interests to the designated projects over time. 
Data on entrepreneurs’ donor-advised funds was collected through the annual report of 
Charity Federations, press releases, and corporate CSR reports. If the entrepreneur has a 
fund, it was coded as 1, if not, as 0. Also, the year of establishing a fund (if there is any) 
was also recorded. This is a time-varying variable. 
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Involvement of civil nonprofit (X3): The entrepreneur’s civic engagement is measured 
by his/her membership in civil nonprofits, especially his/her leadership roles in the 
organization. A civil nonprofit organization is a social organization usually originated by 
nongovernment agency, such as entrepreneur clubs, industry associations, grassroots 
nonprofit organizations. Entrepreneurs sometimes report their civil involvement at 
Federation of Industry and Commerce, charity federation, and public foundations; 
however, these organizations have strong government affiliations, and they are not coded 
as civil nonprofit organizations. An entrepreneur who is the member of a civil 
organization was coded as 1; an entrepreneur who is not involved in the civil nonprofit 
was coded as 0. This variable is time-constant binary covariant. 
Number of businesses intersecting with public welfare (X4): In economics, a public 
good is a good that is both nonexcludable and nonrivalrous in that individuals cannot be 
effectively excluded from use and where use by one individual does not reduce 
availability to others. Public goods can be provided both by government and the market. 
When the public goods can be excluded through limited access to the products or be of 
differentiated quality, the market will provide it. In this study, the business industry that 
intersects with public welfare denotes the industry that provides public goods through 
private excludable markets. Such industries include art, private education, health, culture, 
environmental sustainability, and nursing, or industries that mainly serve disadvantaged 
populations (e.g.,farmers/agriculture), children, elders, and woman. If an entrepreneurs’ 
business involves the aforementioned public good provision, the researcher recorded the 
number of his or her industries that intersect with public welfare. If no industry 
intersected with public welfare, it was recorded as 0. This is also a time-constant variable. 
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Institutional logic (X5): Institutional logic is a pre-existing knowledge and beliefs 
shared by members of a society. It means, in this study, the environment's overall attitude 
and actions toward charitable giving. Locations, where the individual and corporate 
resides, shaped charitable giving culture and values. Based on this rational, the 
Philanthropy Development Index has been produced since 2011 by the Chinese Ministry 
of Civil Affairs to rate the charitableness of Chinese cities. This index examined six 
aspects in four dimensions. The six aspects in the vertical axis included social donations, 
social organizations, charitable project, volunteering, city government’s financial support, 
and philanthropic culture. The four dimensions in the horizontal axis included size 
(quantity), structure (quality), contribution (output), and sustainability (potentials). About 
32 indicators are examined with a total score of 320. The study uses this index as the 
measure of institutional logic. The entrepreneur whose business home is in the higher 
“philanthropy development” city was assigned a higher value per the index. Due to 
stability of institutional logic, the study uses the three-year average score for each city. If 
the entrepreneur’s city was not in the ranking list, the researcher assigned the average 
score of the province that the city belongs to. This score is a time-constant variable.  
Power1- Political status level (X6): Under China's current Constitution, the China 
people’s congress (CPC) and the People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a 
consultative body whose members represent various social groups, are the main 
deliberative bodies of China. The National People’s Congress is structured as a 
unicameral legislature, with the power to legislate, the power to oversee the operations of 
the government, and the power to elect the major officers of state. Understandably, a 
member of the CPC and the CPPCC will have more power in the political capital and 
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social capital arenas. Both the CPC and the CPPCC have regional committees, which 
include provincial, prefecture, and county level. Entrepreneurs who assume either 
national CPC or CPPCC memberships were coded as 4, one who has either provincial 
CPC or CPPCC membership as 3, and one who has either municipal CPC or membership 
as 2, and one who has either county CPPCC or CPC membership as 1. Entrepreneurs who 
do not have any CPPCC or CPC membership affiliation were coded as 0. 
Power2- whether a political echelon member  (X7): In addition, another related 
variable to the power is a binary variable measuring whether the entrepreneur has a 
political status, i.e. whether a CPC or CPPCC member affiliation regardless of levels. The 
year of joining either political membership was recoded. This binary variable is a 
time-varying variable. 
Control Variables 
Personal wealth stability. Financial security is an important factor for an 
entrepreneur’s engagement in philanthropy (Schervish, 2014). The Chinese 
entrepreneur’s personal wealth before or at the year of the foundation’s creation may 
affect the entrepreneur’s willingness to commit to a philanthropic foundation. In the case 
of having established a foundation, the most recent three years of the entrepreneurs’ 
personal wealth were gathered prior to his/her foundation’s establishment; otherwise, the 
most recent personal wealth data (2011–2014) were gathered. Personal wealth data 
primarily comes from the Hurun Rich List and Forbes Wealth List. In order to increase 
accuracy, wealth data from both Hurun and Forbes were collected, and an average of the 
two sources was counted as the entrepreneurs’ overall wealth data. A value of 1 was 
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coded if the entrepreneur’s personal wealth has steadily increased or remained at the 
same level; otherwise the value code is 0. 
Age of entrepreneur. Age affects one’s philanthropic giving. A person’s age 
especially can affect a philanthropist’s decision about whether he or she wants to create 
an institution in order to leave a legacy (Odendahl, 1987). The entrepreneur’s age at the 
time of the foundation establishment, or as of 2014, was recorded depending on whether 
a foundation is created. 
Number of children. The number of children of the entrepreneur can influence the 
entrepreneur’s decision on whether to establish a foundation (Brooks, 2005; Brown & 
Ferris, 2007). Many cases have shown that establishing a foundation can help improve 
family relationships for the ultra-wealthy family. Therefore, data on number of children 
of the entrepreneur was collected as a control variable. 
Education level. Education level can play an important role for the entrepreneur’s 
philanthropic choice. Four categories of education level are distinguished: Entrepreneurs 
with overseas education, entrepreneurs with MBA degrees, entrepreneurs with other types 
of college education, and entrepreneurs with education lower than college degrees. The 
number of 4, 3, 2, and 1 was assigned, respectively, for each aforementioned category. 
Public-listed. The number of social responsibly reporting requirements for 
public-listed companies is growing, driven by regulatory and stock exchanges around the 
world (The Initiative for Responsible Investment, 2013). Whether the entrepreneur’s 
company is public-listed can be a sensitive factor in the study. If the entrepreneur ‘s 
company is public-listed, it was assigned as 1; otherwise, 0. 
 50 
Age of company. The age of the entrepreneur’s company operation is an indicator of 
the entrepreneur’s sense of stability and openness to innovation; this may become a factor 
for the entrepreneur’s decision to establish a foundation. The age of the entrepreneur’s 
corporation at the time of foundation establishment, or as of 2014, was recorded.  
Ownership concentration. The percentage of the entrepreneur’s shareholding in the 
company can be an important factor in the decision to establish a foundation. The 
researcher coded the ownership as a binary variable: 1 if ownership percentage ≥0.5; 0 if 
ownership percentage <0.5. 
Family controlled. Family-control of the company will give the entrepreneur more 
power and control over decision-making. Research has confirmed that family firms are 
generous givers (Reis & Clohesy, 2001). This is also a binary variable. 
Number of employees. The firm size is found by many studies to be a major factor 
in corporate giving (Burlingame & Frishkoff, 1996). The number of employees is an 
important indicator of the firm size. The size of the company is a control variable, 
because larger companies are more resourceful and more visible. The researcher coded 
this variable into a categorical variable: The value of 1 was assigned if the number of 
employees is between 1–999; 2 if between 1,000–4,999; 3 if between 5,000–9,999; 4 if 
between 10,000–29,999; 5 if larger than 30,000. 
Coastal areas. Studies of China often make the distinction between firms located in 
coastal versus interior areas, because the former typically have better market 
infrastructures (Park & Luo, 2001). If entrepreneur’s company sits in a coastal area, it 
was coded as 1, and otherwise, as 0. 
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Number of branches. Companies with more branches tend to deal with multiple 
philanthropic requests (Saiia, Caroll, Buchholtz, 2003). The creation of a foundation can 
serve multiple purposes for different branches. The researcher further categorized the 
number of branches after data collection. The value of 1 was assigned if the number of 
branches is between 1–29; 2 if between 30–100; 3 if more than 100.  
Number of firms with a foundation in an industry group. Studies of practice 
diffusion find that a practice adopted by socially proximate firms (such as firms in the 
same industry) will be more quickly adopted by the focal firm because of the ease of 
obtaining information, the perceived relevance of the practice, and the pressure of being 
left behind (e.g., Davis & Greve, 1997). In this study, corporate foundations existing in 
the same industry group as the entrepreneur’s company may encourage other 
entrepreneurs to set up a similar foundation. Data on this variable was first obtained 
through China Foundation Center’s database on corporate philanthropy as of December 
30, 2014. The researcher coded this variable by first identifying the core business 
industry of the entrepreneur and then calculated how many corporate foundations have 
been established in the similar industry as of the end of 2014. 
Giving to civil organizations. The entrepreneurs’ past giving history may be an 
influential factor to their creation of foundations. On the one hand, their giving history 
indicated their diverse network, which potentially supports the mission of the 
entrepreneurs’ foundation in the near future; on the other hand, the past giving history to 
civil organizations suggests their heterogeneity in charitable giving or civic values. The 
entrepreneurs’ donation recipients are gathered through company website and/or media 
releases. The entrepreneurs’ donation usually goes to government, schools, local charity 
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federations, civil nonprofit organizations, traditional charities (such as orphanage, elder 
homes), industry organizations or business associations, individuals, and noncivil 
foundations and associations. The variable, giving to civil organizations, mainly 
embraces giving that goes to civil nonprofit organizations, industry organizations, or 
business associations, and individuals. If the entrepreneur has given to the 
aforementioned civil organizations, it was coded as 1; otherwise, as 0.   
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Chapter 5: Data Analysis and Results 
Brief Introduction to Event History Analysis 
The research question in this study examines whether Chinese entrepreneurs 
establish their own foundations and, if yes, what factors correlate with the creation of 
foundations? Research methodology calls for event history analysis if the researcher’s 
question is centered on whether—and if so, when—events occur (Teckle & Vermund, 
2010). 
The event history analysis is also commonly known as survival analysis, duration 
analysis, or hazard modeling. It is concerned with the patterns and correlates of the 
occurrence of events (Yamaguchi, 1991). This method was developed by biostatisticians 
in the 1970s and has been extended by economists and sociologists to the study of social 
transitions since the 1980s (see Singer & Willett, 1991). Since 1991, event history 
analysis has been introduced and popularized in psychology, education, political science, 
and other behavioral science research. Regardless of the different names, these statistical 
techniques address similar research goals: to help understand whether an event occurs 
and if so, when. Below is a brief introduction about some key concepts related to event 
history analysis. 
An event is a transition from one state to another. The event can be death, divorce or 
marriage, occurrence of disease, leaving a job, etc. The occurrence or nonoccurrence of 
the event is recorded as event status or state. At every point in time, each individual 
occupies one state. In the current research, the entrepreneur is either in the state of “has 
not established a foundation” or “has established a foundation.” In some cases, an event 
can occur several times (this is called recurrent events), such as recovery of depression. 
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In this study, the event of interest occurs only once because it is not possible to exit the 
destination state and go back to the original state. 
Risk period. The period that someone is exposed to a particular risk is called the risk 
period. To be able to experience the risk, one must occupy the original state. For example, 
the entrepreneurs who have never established a foundation in a particular year are at “risk” 
of experiencing the event of establishing a foundation. All subjects who are at risk of 
experiencing the event concerned are the risk set. 
Building on the above concepts, event history analysis can be defined as the 
“analysis of the duration of the nonoccurrence of an event during the risk period” (Teckel 
and Vermunt, 2010, p.5). When the event of interest is “creation of a foundation,” the 
analysis concerns the duration of nonoccurrence of the experience of creating a 
foundation. In practice, the event history model, as Teckel and Vermunt (2010) noted, is 
not duration or time itself but a “transition probability or hazard rate” (ibid, p.5). In this 
study this concerns an entrepreneur’s probability of establishing a foundation given that 
this did not happen before. 
The event history analysis is used to study the duration until the occurrence of the 
event of interest, where the duration is measured from the time at which an individual 
becomes exposed to the “risk” of experiencing the event (Steele, 2005). For example, a 
teacher is at risk of leaving his or her job from the time he or she starts his or her teaching. 
In some instances, the researcher must choose an appropriate origin when it is less 
obvious to detect the origin. 
The data of event history analysis are collected through retrospective or prospective 
study designs, or through experimental or observational study. Retrospective data 
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collection is most common in event history analysis; this approach looks back to the dates 
when events happened since a certain time point or during a fixed window of time before 
the study end point. 
The time to event or survival time can be continuous or discrete. When the event 
time takes on any nonnegative value, it will assume a continuous-time method. When the 
event time takes on a finite set of values, it will assume a discrete-time method. Events 
that occur at discrete time points (e.g. weekly, monthly, yearly) can be analyzed with the 
discrete-time method; whereas, in other situations, events that occur at real 
continuous-time (e.g. seconds, minutes, hours, or days) can be analyzed with a 
continuous-time method. 
A typical event history database contains information on whether the event(s) of 
interest occurred to the individuals in the sample and, if so, the time of occurrence, risk 
factors, social demographic covariates, and/or the treatment or intervention received if 
any. Among the covariates, some are time-constant variables and some are time-varying 
variables. 
The event history analysis method distinguishes itself from other regression methods, 
such as linear or logistic regression. As noted earlier, subjects in the event history 
analysis are usually followed up over a specific period of time, and the focus is on the 
time at which the events of interest occurs. Simple linear and logistic regression methods 
are not suited to dealing with two distinctive features of event history analysis data: 
censoring and time-varying variables (Willet & Singer, 1993). Censoring is a type of 
missing-data problem resulting from the unknown time of event occurrence when the 
subjects did not experience an event during the observation period. Censoring arises for 
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two major reasons (Willet & Singer, 1991): a) some individuals will never experience the 
event; b) some will experience the event, but not during the study’s observation periods. 
The event history analysis assumes the censoring is missing data at random. Linear and 
regression models lack a way to deal with censoring data and yield a biased result or loss 
of information. Moreover, the standard regression models are not able to deal with 
time-varying covariates, variables that may change their value over time. On the contrary, 
event history analysis models can correctly incorporate both censoring data and 
time-varying covariates. 
Data Analysis for the Current Study 
Because event time is measured on a year-to-year basis, discrete-time event history 
analysis is used to examine how likely and how soon Chinese entrepreneurs shift to 
establishing their own foundations. Continuous-time event history analysis statistical 
models have their own statistical packages, such as Cox proportion hazard models, but 
proportional and nonproportional hazard models are used to analyze the discrete-time 
data using a modification of logistic regression known as discrete-time survival models 
(DTSM) (Singer & Willett, 1991). The discrete-time event history model is used to 
analyze the probability distribution of the random time-period variable J, the duration of 
nonoccurrence of the event, and to gain an understanding of how risk factors and 
covariates affect the event times (Teckel and Vermunt, 2010). The detailed data analysis 
procedures are delineated below: 
First, the researcher defined the state, event, and length of the study time. In this 
study, the entrepreneur occupies two possible exclusive states: establishing a foundation 
or not establishing a foundation. The target event occurs when the entrepreneur shifts 
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from not having a foundation to establishing a foundation. The beginning of time for this 
retrospective data observation started in 2003, a point in time before any of the sample 
subjects had established a foundation. Therefore, the t0 is the period of 2003, which 
means that during this time no Chinese entrepreneurs in the sample established their own 
foundations. The year of 2004 is the beginning time (t1) of the event history analysis. The 
concluding time is 2014(t11). The time unit is in years. The event history analysis requires 
time intervals, so the series of time intervals is as follow: [t0,t1), [t1,t2),….[tj-1, tj), [tj, 
tj+1),… and so on. Let the letter j index periods. Any event occurring at t1  (or 2004) but 
before t2 (or 2005) is classified as an event happening during the first time interval [t1, t2). 
The jth (or 2014) time interval, [tj, tj+1), begins immediately at time tj (or 2014) and end 
just before time t j+1 (or 2015). The conventional mathematical notation [bracket] denotes 
inclusions, and (parenthesis) denotes exclusions. For example, the interval [t1, t2) or 
[2004,2005) means that the event occurs at t1 or 2004 but not in t2 or 2005. The covariates 
or predictors are indicated as P in this study, and the number of predictors as Pn (p = 1, 2, 
3, ….N). In this study, for example, p1 is the number of consumer-related industry. 
Because some variables are time-varying variables, for instance, whether entrepreneur 
has a fund and the year of joining the political echelon, the researcher records the values 
of all predictor in every time period. Thus, for any individual i, the value of his/her each 
N predictors in time period j as the vector pij = [p1ij, p2ij, p3ij,…..pnij ].  
Second, the researcher reconstructed data from a person-oriented dataset into a 
person-period dataset due to the combination of both time-variant and time-invariant 
variables. Although the discrete-time model uses a logistic regression approach, the 
person-oriented dataset, which is used in standard regression analysis, cannot handle the 
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subjects that have a different number of records depending on the duration or stay in the 
risk set. Instead, the discrete time history model requires a person-period dataset. The set 
of dummy variables D1 through D11 are also created to represent each time period in the 
logistic regression model for the discrete time history model. The dummy variable D1 = 1 
if period = tj and 0 otherwise. A dichotomous event indicator is created for the occurrence 
of “creation of a foundation” to indicate whether an entrepreneur experiences the event 
during the time period concerned (0 = no event, 1 = event). For each entrepreneur, the 
event indicator is 0 in every record except the last. Noncensored entrepreneurs experience 
the event in their last period, so the variable event takes on the value of 1 in that last 
period. For example, if an entrepreneur experiences an event in the fifth period, the event 
indicator only takes on the value of 1 in the fifth period, i.e. the last period of his or her 
observations. Censored entrepreneurs never experience at the periods in the data, so the 
variable event remains 0 through the records. Values of the time-constant covariates are 
repeated in each time period. The person-period dataset contains all information on 
survival time, including information for censored observations. After creating the 
person-period data, the existing procedures in general statistical packages can be directly 
used for event history analysis without any modification for censoring (Teckel and 
Vermunt, 2010). After splitting the data, the total records amount to 2,022. 
Third, the researcher described data with the life-table method. Different from 
conventional data description that reports mean and standard deviation, the life table is 
used in event history analysis for data description. The life-table method and the Kaplan- 
Meier estimator are two descriptive methods for estimating the event-time distribution 
from a sample. The life-table method computes nonparametric estimates of the survival 
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and hazard functions in different time-intervals. The life table contains the following 
statistics: the number of cases at risk (or the number of subjects entering the respective 
interval without having experiencing the event), proportion of cases that experience the 
event (hazard hj), and cumulative proportion surviving (survival function Slj). Among 
them, the hazard function, defined as conditional probability that a randomly selected 
individual will experience the target event in time period j, given that he or she did not 
experience the event prior to j, is the most important function. 
It not only exactly assesses whether and, if so, when the event occurs, but also 
includes data from both noncensored and censored cases. As the central focus of the 
analysis, the researcher estimates the values of the hazard probability and examines their 
dependency on selected covariates. See Table 3 for the life table description statistics. 
  
hj = Pr [T=j| T≥j]  
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Table 3. Life Table Describing the Time Periods at “Establishing a Foundation” 
    Number  Proportion  
Time 
periods 
Time interval Entering 
interval  
(risk set) 
Established 
foundation 
during the 
interval  
(or “failure”/ 
event) 
Established 
foundation 
during 
interval 
(hazard) 
Who has not 
established a 
foundation at the 
end of interval 
(survival 
function) 
j0 [2003,2004) 209 0 0 1 
j1 [2004,2005) 209 3 0.0144 0.9856 
j2 [2005,2006) 206 5 0.0243 0.9617 
j3 [2006,2007) 201 3 0.0149 0.9474 
j4 [2007,2008) 198 9 0.0455 0.9043 
j5 [2008,2009) 189 5 0.0265 0.8804 
j6 [2009,2010) 184 6 0.0326 0.8517 
j7 [2010,2011) 178 5 0.0281 0.8278 
j8 [2011,2012) 173 8 0.0462 0.7895 
j9 [2012,2013) 165 4 0.0242 0.7703 
j10 [2013,2014) 161 3 0.0186 0.756 
j11 [2014,2015) 158 2 0.0127 0.7464 
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The hazard and survival function over the time is reported in the Figure 2 below: 
 
 
Figure 2. Hazard rate and survival rate over the time periods for “establishing a 
foundation.” 
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Fourth, the researcher fitted the model and tested the hypothesis. In building these 
models, maximum likelihood estimates are calculated for each mode and the fitted model. 
The likelihood function for the discrete event time model expresses the probability of the 
event occurrence actually observed over time. The probability of observing an event 
occurrence for the ith individual at the time period tj  given that the event has not 
occurred before, is hi (tj). Then, the probability of observing an event nonoccurrence for 
the ith individual at the time period tj, given that the event has not occurred before, is [1- 
hi (tj)]. The likelihood function can be mathematically expressed as the following: 
Where Π is a product sign, v is the total sample size. The eventij is the binary value of 
the event variable for the ith person at jth period. J refers to the last time period observed 
for anyone in the sample. The two product signs are to make the likelihood function 
multiplies the contribution of each record across all individuals via the first product sign 
and across all time periods for individuals via the second product sign. Because the event 
value takes a value of either 0 or 1, only one of the two terms, (hi (tj) or 1- hi (tj)]), 
contributes to the likelihood function at each record. In other words, in the time period 
when the event does occur, the second term becomes 1. In time periods when the event 
does not occur, the first term becomes 1. The maximum likelihood estimate helps 
estimate the parameters that maximize the likelihood function. The logistic regression 
model is sufficient to provide estimates of the parameters of the discrete event time 
model in a person-period dataset. The researcher first ran the univariate analysis. A result 
of this analysis is shown in Table 4.  
Likelihood= ∏ ∏



 hi (tj) 
event
ij [1- hi (tj)] 
(1-event
ij
 ) 
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Table 4. Univariable Logistic Regression 
Variables Coef. Odd 
ratio 
Standa
rd 
error 
P>|z| 
Number of consumer-related industry 0.0668 1.069 0.0936 0.475 
Whether established a fund  
(time-vary variable) 
0.201 1.222 0.281 0.475 
Involvement of civil nonprofit 0.669** 1.952** 0.287 0.02 
Number of businesses intersecting  
with public welfare 
0.109 1.116 0.193 0.572 
Institutional logic -0.0161 0.984 0.0108 0.135 
Power 1-political status level 0.148 1.16 0.111 0.181 
Power2- whether a political echelon 
member (time-varying) 
1.477*** 4.379*** 0.436 0.001 
Personal wealth stability 1.078*** 2.94*** 0.331 0.001 
Age of entrepreneur -0.107*** 0.898*** 0.0191 0.00 
Number of children 0.0787 1.082 0.155 0.613 
Education level 0.121 1.129 0.167 0.468 
Publicly listed 0.266 1.305 0.279 0.34 
Age of company -0.0969*** 0.908*** 0.021 0.00 
Ownership concentration -0.281 0.755 0.324 0.386 
Family controlled 0.415 1.515 0.332 0.211 
Number of employees 0.112 1.119 0.111 0.312 
Number of branches 0.0624 1.064 0.191 0.744 
Coastal areas -0.36 0.698 0.283 0.203 
Number of firms with a foundation in 
an industry group 
0.00161 1.002 0.00156 0.303 
Giving to civil organizations 0.662** 1.939** 0.28 0.018 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
 
Then, the researcher dropped control variables whose p values are larger than 0.2. 
According to Vittinghoff et al. (2005), the “parsimonious” models that only include 
predictors that are statistically significant at p<0.05 or even stricter criteria is not reliable, 
because there is substantial residual confounding in such model. It has been suggested 
that potential residual confounding problems can be eliminated only if p >0.20 and 
variables that are at 0.20 or below can be kept in the model (Maldonado & Greenland, 
1993). Thus, the following control variables are selected for the next step’s model 
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building: personal wealth stability, age of entrepreneur, age of company, coastal areas, 
and giving to civil organizations. The results of rerunning regression models of each 
predictor and all control variables showed that the variable, number of firms with a 
foundation in an industry group, is a statistical significant influencer; hence, it was added 
on to the control variable list. 
Prior to the model building assessing the effects of additional predictors, it is 
recommended that all discrete-time survival analyses begin with an initial model that 
only include time variables (D1 through D11) (Singer & Willett, 1993). Generally 
speaking, the analysis follows the model structure below: 
 
Where [D1ij ,D2ij , D3ij, … DJij ] are a sequence of dummy variables. The model 
indicates that the conditional log-odds that the event will occur in each time period j 
(given that it did not occur before) is a linear function of a constant term, α, specific to 
period j, and of the values of the predictors periods j multiplied by the appropriate slope 
parameters. In the discrete-time hazard model, there is no single standalone intercept, and 
the alpha parameters, αj or (α1, α2, α3…. αJ), act as multiple intercepts (Singer & Willett, 
2003). When all covariates are set to zero, only the time value of time dummies, (α1, α2, 
α3…. αJ), remains in the model. The [α1, α2, α3…. αJ] also represent the population baseline 
logit-hazard probability of experiencing the event when all covariates are all zero, given 
that they have not experienced any. In each model, the dummy variables for each period 
Logit (hi (tj )) or loge (

	
) = (α1 D1ij + α2 D2ij + α3 D3ij + .... +αJ DJij ) 
+ (β1P1ij + β2 P2ij + β3P3ij  + …+ βnPnij ) 
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of time are represented (α1 through αJ). Each coefficient of the dummy variable for time 
periods (αj) is the population value of logit hazard in time period j for the baseline group, 
for j = 1,2,3……J. The researcher has adopted the general model in parameterizing the 
main effect of time on hazard in the aforementioned analysis. The inclusion of these 
dummy variables does not put constraint on the shape of the baseline model and 
facilitates the interpretation of the coefficients (Teckel and Vermunt, 2010); however, this 
leads the general model to be overparameterized and lack parsimony when the interaction 
of time and other predictors are taken into consideration (Singer & Willett, 1993). The 
solution is to consider the time periods as if they are continuous covariates and a 
specification of polynomial model for the baseline logit hazard function; this approach 
gives a more parsimonious model. The parsimonious model can reap improvement in 
statistical power, coefficient stability, and time to convergence during estimation (Singer 
& Willett, 1993). The polynomial representation can be linear, quadratic, cubic, or higher 
degree polynomials. The researcher searches for the best polynomial models by 
comparing the general model (original model with each time period representation) with 
linear, quadratic, and cubic models. A likelihood ratio test is further conducted to see the 
statistic difference between a polynomial model and general model. A good polynomial 
model should show no significant statistical difference with the general model. Table 5 
displays the deviance statistics and differences in deviance statistics for the likelihood 
ratio test. It is clear that the quadratic model is as good as the general model. Thus, the 
quadratic polynomial representation of the time periods is parsimonious as well as fits the 
data as good as the general model for the discrete event time history analysis for this 
study. The parameters of the polynomial models are estimated using maximum likelihood 
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method. The smaller AIC value, the better fit of the polynomial representation compared 
to the general model. 
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Table 5. Polynomial Representations for Time Period in a Baseline Model 
    Difference in 
-2LL comparison 
to 
  
 Polynomial 
model for the 
baseline logit 
hazard 
#of 
param
eters 
-2LL  Previous 
model 
General 
model 
AIC BIC  
Constant 
model 
Logit (hi (tj )) 
=α0  
1 
245.3014 - 4.6527 
492.6
028 
498.21
47 
Linear 
model 
Logit (hi (tj )) 
=α0 + b1periodj 
2 
245.2871 0.0143 4.6384 
494.5
741 
505.79
78 
Quadrati
c model 
Logit (hi (tj )) 
=α0 + b1periodj 
+ b2 periodj
2  
3 
242.8679 2.4192 2.2192 
491.7
357 
508.57
13 
Cubic 
model 
Logit (hi (tj )) 
=α0 + b1periodj- 
+ b2 periodj
2 
+b3 periodj
3  
4 
242.8084 0.0595 2.1597 
493.6
169 
516.06
43 
General 
model 
Logit (hi (tj )) 
=α1 D1ij + α2 D2ij 
+ α3 D3ij + .... 
+αJ DJij  
J(11) 
240.6487 
  
503.2
973 
565.02
76 
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As is seen in Table 5, the quadratic model is as good a fit as the general model. 
Hence, the polynomial specification representation of the model is now rewritten as 
below: 
Lastly, the researcher ran major models that contain variables testing major 
hypotheses and selected control variables to assess the effects of additional predictors. 
Each predictor within the same hypothesis group was added to the previous model to see 
the influence on the hazard rate. Table 6 is a detailed presentation of the major models. 
Lastly, the likelihood ratio test was used to test the significance of the effects of the 
covariates in each of the models. The -2 Log Likelihood statistic (-2 LL), the deviance 
statistic for the discrete event history models, was calculated and reported between two 
nested models to figure out models that fit best. The smaller deviance, the better fit the 
model is to the observed data. Note that two models are nested when both models contain 
the same parameters and one of the models has at least one additional parameter. When 
comparing the reduced model (the one with less covariates) and the model with 
additional variables, we reject the null hypothesis if the difference of deviance statistic is 
larger than the critical value for chi-square distribution and conclude that some models 
with additional covariates are a better fit and the added covariates have significant effect 
on the log odds of event occurrence (Teckel and Vermunt, 2010). The detailed process of 
calculating the -2 Log Likelihood statistic and discussion are elaborated in the next 
Logit (hi (tj )) or loge (

	
) = α0 + b1periodj+ b2 periodj
2 + β1P1ij + β2 P2ij + 
β3P3ij  + …+ βnPnij 
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chapter. The parameter estimates and associated goodness-of-fit statistics for the selected 
models are displayed in the Table 6, and it supports later discussion. 
Table 6. Parameter Estimates and Goodness of Fit 
Covariates Param- 
eter 
Model 1 
estfdt 
Model 2 
estfdt 
Model 3 
estfdt 
Model 4 
estfdt 
Model 5 
estfdt 
Model6 
estfdt 
Model 7 
estfdt 
Year 1 (j1) α1 -4.229*** 
(0.0145) 
0.135 
(1.1451) 
0.457 
(1.58) 
-0.66 
(0.517) 
1.275 
(3.579) 
-1.863 
(0.1553) 
-1.134 
(0.322) 
Year 2 (j2) α2 -3.694*** 
(0.02488) 
1.881 
(6.5621) 
2.236 
(9.358) 
1.141 
(3.128) 
3.034* 
(20.777) 
-.056 
(0.945) 
0.938 
(2.554) 
Year 3 (j3) α3 -4.190*** 
(0.01516) 
1.54 
(4.666) 
1.927 
(6.871) 
0.872 
(2.391) 
2.678 
(14.56) 
-0.412 
(0.662) 
0.686 
(1.985) 
Year 4 (j4) α4 -3.045*** 
(0.0476) 
2.535* 
(12.62) 
2.923** 
(18.605) 
1.866 
(6.462) 
3.667 
(39.132) 
0.588 
(1.8) 
1.678 
(5.357) 
Year 5 (j5) α5 -3.605*** 
(0.0272) 
2.342 
(10.406) 
2.742* 
(15.516) 
1.676 
(5.346) 
3.478** 
(32.404) 
0.375 
(1.455) 
1.503 
(4.494) 
Year 6 (j6) α6 -3.390*** 
(00337) 
1.949 
(7.0233) 
2.305 
(10.027) 
1.269 
(3.556) 
3.101** 
(22.223) 
-0.222 
(0.8009) 
0.872 
(2.39) 
Year 7 (j7) α7 -3.544*** 
(0.0289) 
2.275 
(9.7266) 
2.601 
(13.474) 
1.596 
(4.931) 
3.431** 
(30.906) 
0.105 
(1.112) 
1.183 
(3.265) 
Year 8 (j8) α8 -3.027*** 
(0.04848) 
2.778* 
(16.091) 
3.063** 
(21.39) 
2.118 
(8.312) 
3.935** 
(51.164) 
-0.468 
(1.77) 
1.655 
(5.233) 
Year 9 (j9) α9 -3.695*** 
(0.02484) 
1.743 
(5.7117) 
1.998 
(7.376) 
1.077 
(2.934) 
2.916 
(18.475) 
-0.014 
(0.626) 
0.598 
(1.819) 
Year 10 (j10) α10 -3.964*** 
(0.01899) 
2.199 
(9.0184) 
2.434 
(11.408) 
1.558 
(4.75) 
3.369* 
(29.057) 
-0.014 
(0.986) 
1.061 
(2.889) 
Year 11 (j11) α11 -4.357*** 
(0.0128) 
1.093 
(2.9837) 
1.285 
(3.616) 
0.452 
(1.573) 
2.264 
(9.621) 
-1.176 
(0.309) 
-0.152 
(0.859) 
Personal 
wealth 
stability  
(yes = 1) 
β8  1.037*** 
(2.821) 
1.054*** 
(2.871) 
0.977*** 
(2.711) 
1.0685**
* 
(2.911) 
0.9554 
(2.6) 
1.032*** 
(2.808) 
Number of 
firms with a 
foundation 
in an 
industry 
group 
β9  0.00288* 
(1.003) 
0.0028 
(1.003) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.0028* 
(1.003) 
0.003*** 
(1.003) 
0.00217 
(1.002) 
Age of 
entrepreneur 
β10  -0.107**
* 
(0.8982) 
-0.112**
* 
(0.894) 
-0.1029*
** 
(0.902) 
-0.11*** 
(0.896) 
-0.101**
* 
(0.9036) 
-0.106**
* 
(0.899) 
Age of 
company 
β11  -0.0530* 
(0.9484) 
-0.06* 
(0.942) 
-0.047 
(0.954) 
-0.0519*
* 
(0.949) 
-0.057** 
(0.945) 
-0.0578*
* 
(0.944) 
Giving to 
civil 
organization
s (yes = 1) 
β12  0.231 
(1.260) 
0.06 
(1.062) 
0.207 
(1.23) 
0.2622 
(1.3) 
 
0.299 
(1.348) 
0.169 
(1.184) 
Coastal 
areas (yes = 
1) 
β13  -0.176 
(0.8384) 
-0.199 
(0.819) 
-0.196 
(0.822) 
0.0699 
(1.07) 
-0.097 
(0.908) 
0.247 
(1.281) 
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Covariates Param- 
eter 
Model 1 
estfdt 
Model 2 
estfdt 
Model 3 
estfdt 
Model 4 
estfdt 
Model 5 
estfdt 
Model6 
estfdt 
Model 7 
estfdt 
Number of 
consumer- 
related 
industry 
β1   -o.034 
( 0.9664) 
   -0.173 
(0.841) 
Whether 
established a 
fund (time 
vary)  
(yes = 1) 
β2   0.561 
(1.753) 
   0.474 
(1.607) 
Involvement 
of civil 
nonprofit 
(yes = 1) 
β3    0.399 
(1.687) 
  0.474 
(1.606) 
Number of 
businesses 
intersecting 
with public 
welfare 
β4    0.997* 
(1.49) 
  0.590** 
(1.804) 
Institutional 
logic 
β5     -0.017 
(0.984) 
 -0.0188 
(0.981) 
Power1- 
political 
status level 
β6       
0.0998 
(1.105) 
0.153 
(1.165) 
Power2- 
whether a 
political 
echelon 
member 
(time vary) 
(yes = 1 ) 
β7      1.817*** 
(6.149) 
1.736*** 
(5.676) 
(-)2LL  240.6487 155.4534 154.3828 153.264 154.8009 147.348 143.1788 
Note. The value in the parenthesis is the odd ratio or exponentiation of the parameter.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The fitting full model for the current study (with parameters) is as shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Quadratic Polynomial Model Output and Estimate 
Logistic regression  Number of obs = 1524 
    LR chi2(15) = 77.46 
    Prob> chi2 = 0.000 
Log likelihood = -146.34664  Pseudo R2 = 0.2093 
       
estd Coef. Std. Err z p>|z| [95% conf. Interval] 
j .7307758 .2794052 2.62 0.009 .1831518 1.2784 
j2 -.0594118 .0230664 -2.58 0.010 -.104621 -.0142026 
Number of 
consumer-related 
industry 
-.1716418 .1463243 -1.17 0.241 -.4584323 .1151486 
Involvement of civil 
nonprofit (yes=1) 
.4612024 .3863271 1.19 0.233 -.2959848 1.21839 
Number of businesses 
intersecting with public 
welfare 
.5651033 .2819127 2.00 0.045 .0125645 1.117642 
Institutional logic -.0184506 .0158053 -1.17 0.243 -.0494284 .0125271 
Power1- political status 
level 
.1345626 .2058245 0.65 0.513 -.268846 .5379712 
Power2- whether a 
political echelon 
member (time vary) 
(yes = 1) 
1.695158 .6532775 2.59 0.009 .4147573 2.975558 
Whether established a 
fund (time vary) (yes = 
1) 
.4454728 .3907297 1.14 0.254 -.3203433 1.211289 
Personal wealth 
stability  
(yes = 1) 
 
1.002124 .3780248 2.65 0.008 .2612088 1.743039 
Number of firms with a 
foundation in an 
industry group 
.0021147 .001908 1.11 0.268 -.001625 .0058544 
Age of entrepreneur -.106428 .0266874 -3.99 0.000 -.1587343 -.0541217 
Age of company -.0571886 .028656 -2.00 0.046 -.1133534 -.0010239 
Giving to civil 
organizations (yes = 1) 
.2035541 .3734282 0.55 0.586 -.5283517 .9354599 
Coastal areas (yes = 1) .2359195 .448065 0.53 0.599 -.6422719 1.114111 
_cons -.6248643 1.95844 -0.32 0.750 -4.463337 3.213608 
 
By fitting the model in the equation for the current study, we got:  
Logit (hi (tj))= -0.625 + 0.731periodj– 0.059 periodj 
2 - 
0.172consumer_Industry+0.446fundj+0.461Civil_Involvement+0.565Intersect_tot–
0.018Instutiional_logic+0.135political_level+1.695politicalj+1.002wealth_stable+0.002indus
try_number_fdn – 0.106 age – 0.057corpage + 0.204give_civil +0.246coastal 
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Lastly, the researcher did various tests about the model, including a multicollinearity 
test, model adequacy proportionality assumption, and unobserved heterogeneity. The 
results show that there is no multicollinearity between the independent variables (the 
mean VIF = 1.21) and the model is adequate (p = 0.6864); the proportionality assumption 
is appropriate; and it has insignificant frailty. In Chapter 6, the researcher continues to 
interpret the data analysis results and discuss the findings. 
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Chapter 6: Data Interpretation and Discussion 
Data Interpretation 
Table 3 shows a life table for the data on Chinese entrepreneurs’ heterogeneous 
responses to conditions of the creation of foundations. The hazard life table (Table 3) 
contains information on the time period intervals, the number of entrepreneurs who enter 
each successive period interval without experiencing the event (or the risk set), 
cumulative event occurrence rate (or cumulative failure rate), standard errors of the 
cumulative failure rate, the hazard rate (the proportion of event occurrence to the risk set), 
and 95% confidence interval. From Figure 2, the plot that estimates hazard function 
based on the hazard rate column of Table 3, shows that the risk of establishing a 
foundation is small in the first three periods (i.e. the time interval, [2004, 2007)), and it in 
general increases with time starting from 2007 until 2012 (or period 4 to 8 [2007,2012)) 
when it drops suddenly and thereafter to the approximate level of the first three periods. 
In general, the “risky” time periods for entrepreneurs’ establishing a foundation are from 
period 4 with a high peak at period 8 ([2011, 2012)). Since the survival is the 
complement of hazard function, meaning the survival rate is high when the hazard rate is 
low, or vice versa, Chinese entrepreneurs tended not to establish their foundations from 
2004 to 2007 (2004, 2007). The explanation for this finding is intuitive: Establishing a 
foundation is a new phenomenon; the path dependence is still high, given the foundation 
regulation was only enacted in 2004. 
Then, how many periods does an average Chinese entrepreneur resist the creation of 
his or her foundation? Due to censoring of the event time for those who have not 
established a foundation and the fact that the event time is now known for all individuals, 
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the sample mean cannot be used as an estimate of the center of the event time distribution. 
Instead, the estimated median life time (survival time) is the value of time (here time 
period) for which the value of the estimated survival function is 0.5 (Singer and Willett, 
1993). However, due to the rare event (the onset of a new phenomenon), the estimated 
survival function did not reach 0.5; thus a 75 percentile is also acceptable (ibid, 1993). In 
this study, 75% of Chinese entrepreneurs in the sample have not established foundations 
as of 2014. The high survival rate of this study shows that a longer period of study is 
needed for more event occurrence. It also implies the factors that contribute to the very 
new phenomenon are worthy of study. 
Table 4 above displays the result of the initial univariable logistic regression. It is 
seen that among all the covariates (including both major predictors and control variables) 
the following covariates have significant correlation (p<0.05) with the dependent variable: 
involvement of civil nonprofit (+), power2: whether a political echelon member (+), 
personal wealth stability (+), age of entrepreneur (-), age of company (-), and giving to 
civil organizations (+). The sign “+” in the parenthesis indicates the correlation is 
positive, and the sign “ – ” indicates negative correlation. The results suggest that the 
heterogeneous network (civil involvement) does contribute to one’s creation of 
foundation. In addition, the entrepreneur’s access to political power is positively 
correlated to an entrepreneur’s creation of foundation. Since the aforementioned variable 
is a time-vary variable, it also means that entrepreneurs who joined the political echelon 
earlier are more likely to establish the foundation than those who joined later. The reason 
for the political echelon membership’s effect on the creation of a foundation will be 
discussed later in this section when more covariates are added to the model. It is also 
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worthy of mentioning that the following variables alone do not show significant 
correlations with the dependent variable: number of consumer-related industry, number 
of businesses intersecting with public welfare, institutional logic, power1- political status 
level, and whether established fund. Surprisingly, the correlation of a higher institutional 
logic score, although not statistically significant, is negative for the establishment of a 
foundation. One possible explanation is that the institutional logic that prompts charitable 
giving does not necessarily lead to creation of a foundation; Chinese government or 
quasi-government agencies are the major recipients of charitable donations, and a high 
degree of governmental interference usually boosts the local charitable donation (Deng, 
2009). One piece of evidence for this argument is the high amount of donations raised on 
Guangdong Poverty Alleviation Day. The Provincial Government initiated this 
fundraising day, and it is reported that most of the multimillion gifts for Guangdong 
province are made on this occasion (Hurun Research Institute, 2014). 
As reported in Table 6, model 1 contains only the time periods without reporting 
constant and it described the hazard profile over time. Model 1 is estimated using the 
dummy variables for time with a no intercept option for logistic model. The parameters 
α’s for each time period are the logit of the hazard (log odds). The exponentiation of the 
parameters can calculate the odds of the event occurrence. Model 1 is the baseline model, 
and its odds ratio is exactly the result on the hazard probability of life table analysis in 
Table 3. Model 2 is a model with only time variables and control variables. Statistically 
significant control variables include personal wealth stability (α<0.01), age of 
entrepreneur (α<0.01), number of firms with a foundation in an industry group (α<0.1), 
and age of company (α<0.1). Both the entrepreneur’s age and corporation’s age are 
 76 
negatively correlated with the likelihood of establishing a foundation when controlling 
for all other covariates. Such a finding is not consistent with the phenomenon found in 
Western society, where elder philanthropists are more likely to leave a legacy through 
building a philanthropic institution. On the contrary, younger Chinese philanthropists 
tend to be more responsive to newly organized philanthropic giving opportunities. The 
same may be true of the younger companies. Nevertheless, wealth stability is consistent 
with previous literature on charitable giving (Breeze and Lloyd, 2013), and the industry 
competition and peer pressure, which is measured by the number of foundation 
established in the same industry, also exert influence on the adoption of the new 
philanthropic practice (i.e. establishing a foundation). 
In Model 3, the researcher added covariates for number of consumer-related 
industries and whether established a fund in addition to the period dummy variables and 
selected control variables. The reference group contains subjects a value of 0 for the 
“fund,” i.e. entrepreneurs who have never established a donor-advised fund. The 
estimates of the parameters α’s for the reference group are shown as log odds under 
Model 3 in Table 6. The parameter β2 in Model 3 is a shift parameter that displaces the 
baseline log odds of hazard profile for entrepreneurs with a fund (fund = 1) keeping the 
value of number of consumer related industry constant. The estimated log odds for the 
number of consumer-related industries is -0.034 with the corresponding odds ratio of 
0.9664 (exp (-0.034), controlling for fund and selected baseline control variables. The 
estimated log odds for whether established a fund is 0.561 with the corresponding odds 
ratio of 1.753 (exp (0.561), controlling for number of consumer-related industries. 
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Similarly, in Model 4, the parameter β3 is the log odds of hazard profile for 
involvement of civil nonprofit (civil = 1), keeping the value of the number of businesses 
intersecting with public welfare constant. The individual influence of number of 
consumer related industry and the whether has a fund on the dependent variable is also 
calculated. Table 8 is an example of the result of whether established a fund to the 
dependent variable. 
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Table 8.  
   Fitted value of 
   Logit hazard Odds Hazard Survival 
Time 
perio
d 
αj β2 Fund
=0 
Fund=
1 
Fun
d=0 
Fund
=1 
Fund=0 Fund=1 Fund=0 Fund=
1 
Year1 
(j1) 
0.136 -0.43 0.136 -0.02 1.15 1.44 0.53488
3721 
0.590163
934 
0.46511
6279 
0.4098
36066 
Year2
(j2) 
1.88 -0.43 1.88 1.71 6.56 8.53 0.86772
4868 
0.895068
206 
0.13227
5132 
0.1049
31794 
Year3 
(j3) 
1.54 -0.43 1.54 1.34 4.67 6.29 0.82363
3157 
0.862825
789 
0.17636
6843 
0.1371
74211 
Year4 
(j4) 
2.54 -0.43 2.54 2.34 12.6
2 
16.97 0.92657
8561 
0.944351
697 
0.07342
1439 
0.0556
48303 
Year5 
(j5) 
2.34 -0.43 2.34 2.14 10.4
1 
14.1 0.91235
7581 
0.933774
834 
0.08764
2419 
0.0662
25166 
Year6 
(j6) 
1.95 -0.43 1.95 1.76 7.02 9.14 0.87531
1721 
0.901380
671 
0.12468
8279 
0.0986
19329 
Year7
(j7) 
2.28 -0.43 2.28 2.08 9.73 12.3 0.90680
3355 
0.924812
03 
0.09319
6645 
0.0751
8797 
Year8 
(j8) 
2.79 -0.43 2.79 2.6 16.0
9 
19.58 0.94148
6249 
0.951409
135 
0.05851
3751 
0.0485
90865 
Year9 
(j9) 
1.74 -0.43 1.74 1.57 5.72 6.74 0.85119
0476 
0.870801
034 
0.14880
9524 
0.1291
98966 
Year1
0 (j10) 
2.2 -0.43 2.2 2.04 9.02 10.43 0.90019
9601 
0.912510
936 
0.09980
0399 
0.0874
89064 
Year1
1 (j11) 
1.09 -0.43 1.09 0.94 2.98 3.31 0.74874
3719 
0.767981
439 
0.25125
6281 
0.2320
18561 
Note: Hazard rate = odds/(1+odds); survival rate = 1 - hazard rate 
 
The graphic plot of fitted function for whether established a fund to the dependent 
variables is displayed in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.Fitted hazard function from the main effects of FUND. 
   
    
Figure 4. Fitted survival function from the main effects of FUND. 
The graph in Figure 4 explicitly depicts the “risk” of establishing a foundation in 
each time period among entrepreneurs who have constructed their donor-advised funds. 
As is seen here, the influence is not very obvious. The three different fitted functions are 
displayed.  
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Fund=0
Fund=1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Fund=0
Fund=1
 80 
The estimated log odds for involvement of civil nonprofit is 0.399 with corresponding 
odds ratio of 1.687 (exp [0.399]), controlling for number of businesses intersecting with 
the public welfare and selected baseline control variables. The estimated log odds for the 
number of businesses intersecting with the public welfare is 0.997 with corresponding 
odds ratio of 1.49 (exp [o.997]). In Model 5, the estimated log odds for institutional logic 
is -0.017 with corresponding odds ratio of 0.984 (exp [0.984]), controlling for baseline 
control variables. In Model 6, the parameter β8 is the log odds of hazard profile for 
power2: whether a political echelon member (CPC or CPPCC) (political = 1) keeping the 
value of the power1: political status level constant. The estimated log odds for the power1: 
political status level is 0.0998 with corresponding odds ratio of 1.105 (exp [0.0998]) 
when controlling for power2: whether a political echelon member. The estimated log 
odds for power2: whether a political echelon member is 1.817 with corresponding odds 
ratio of 6.149 (exp [1.817]) when controlling for the political levels. Model 7 is a full 
model, which contains all parameters involved in other models. The estimate of all 
parameters is interpreted in similar fashion for each predictor variable controlling for 
other variables. 
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Figure 5. Fitted hazard function for the time at establishing from main effects of 
“whether in political echelon.” 
 
Figure 6. Fitted survival functions for the time at establishing from main effects of 
“whether in political echelon.” 
As discussed in the data analysis section, a likelihood ratio test (LRT) is used to test 
the significance of effects of covariates in each of the models. The likelihood ratio test 
follows this formula: LRT = 2* (InL1- InL2). The LRT approximately follows chi-square 
distribution. In the LRT, degree of freedom (df) is equal to the number of additional 
parameters in the more complex model. Then, the critical value from the Chi-square 
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distribution table can be found. The bottom row of Table 6 shows the deviance statistics 
(-2LL) for the seven models that I use for the current study. I start by comparing model 2 
with model 3, since model 3 is where the independent variables begin. Model 2 is nested 
in all other models except in Model 1 (the baseline time variables). The difference 
between deviance statistic for Model 2 and Model 3 is 2.14 (=2*(154.3828 - 153.264)). 
The value is smaller than chi-square value for df = 2 at 5% level (χ 2 = 5.99). Thus, model 
3 is not statistically better than model 2, and the two covariates (number of 
consumer-related industry and whether established a fund) has no effect on log odds of 
event occurrence. Hypothesis 1a and 1b are not supported. In addition, the researcher 
recognized that hypothesis 1a was based on the assumption of the 2008 earthquake and 
the Red Cross Scandal on the behavior of Chinese entrepreneurs, but the data covered 
both pre-earthquake (scandal) and post-earthquake (scandal) years. The inconsistency 
might be the reason why H1a is not supported. Therefore, the researcher conducted a 
further comparative analysis comparing the effect of consumer-related industry on the 
likelihood of foundation establishment before and after 2008. There is still no 
significance found in the study. 
The difference of deviance statistic between Model 2 and Model 4 is 2.1894 
(=2*(155.4534-153.264)). This value is still smaller than chi-square value at 5% (χ 2 = 
5.99). Thus, Model 4 is no better than Model 2; such variables as civil involvement in 
nonprofit and number of businesses intersecting with public welfare do not add any effect 
on the log of event occurrence. However, it turns out the covariate， the number of 
businesses intersecting with public welfare，indeed has an effect after controlling all other 
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independent variables as presented in Model 7 (odds ratio is 1.804), where the p value of 
this variable is at p<0.05. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is rejected and Hypothesis 3 is supported.  
When comparing Model 5 and Model 2, we get the difference of deviance statistic of 
1.35 (=2*(155.4534 – 154.8009)). The value is much smaller than chi-square value for df 
= 2 at 5% level (χ 2 = 5.99). Thus, the variable, institutional logic, does not contribute to 
the log odds of the event occurrence. Hypothesis 4 is rejected. 
The comparison of Model 6 and Model 2 yield a difference of deviance statistic of 
16.211 (=2*(155.4534 – 147.348)). The value is larger than the chi-square value for df = 
2 at 5% level (χ 2 = 5.99). Thus, we reject the reduced model (Model 2) and conclude that 
Model 6 gives a better fit of the data in such a way that one of the covariates involved in 
the model (power1: political status level and power2: whether a political echelon member) 
have significant effects on the log odds of event occurrence. From Table 6, we can tell the 
p value of power2: whether a political echelon member is p < 0.01, and the level of 
political echelon does not show statistical significance. Thus, we reject Hypothesis 5a and 
support Hypothesis 5b. 
We further compare Model 7 and Model 2 to see the goodness-of-fit. The difference 
of deviance statistics is 24.56 (= 2*(155.4534-143.1788)). This value is larger than 
chi-square value at df = 6 (six more covariates than Model 2) ((χ 2 = 12.59). Model 7 is 
better fit than Model 2. The researcher further compared Model 6 and Model 7. The p 
value of the model difference is p = 0.0155, indicating Model 7 is statistically 
significantly better than Model 6. 
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Discussion 
This study is motivated by the key question of how to explain entrepreneurs’ 
heterogeneous responses to conditions of creation of a foundation. 
Hypothesis 1 posits that conflicts existing within the established institution prompt 
the agent to change. The conflicts are measured by two variables: the number of service 
industries that an entrepreneur’s business involves and whether the entrepreneur has ever 
established a donor-advised fund during the period 2003–2014. Between the two 
variables, whether established a fund (a time-vary variable) is closer to reach a statistical 
significance (p = 0.16). Although not statistically significant, the odds of establishing a 
foundation is 1.75 times higher for entrepreneurs who had established a fund earlier, and 
subsequent times compared to those who remain without the experience of establishing a 
fund controlling for the effect of other covariates in the model. Based on the period under 
study, the higher number of service industry does not motivate an entrepreneur to 
establish a foundation. Thus, the assumed conflict embedded in the previous institutions 
is not the factor that brings the agent for a change in this study. The explanations for this 
finding can be viewed through the flowing three lenses: first, the Red Cross scandal in 
China may have only damped the interests of Chinese entrepreneurs to donate to the Red 
Cross, but the community-based Charity Federations and other many quasi-governmental 
charitable organizations still gain the upper hand in accessing the charitable resources 
from Chinese entrepreneurs through their established donor services. The functional 
inefficiency is not salient at this moment, thus causing little change. Second, the 
motivations of Chinese entrepreneurs’ charitable giving are chiefly of prosocial nature, 
either politically driven (Estes, 1998), or occasion-oriented (such as giving on children’s 
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wedding day, disasters, alma mater’s big anniversaries) (Hurun Research institute, 2014). 
Such an unsystematic, spontaneous way of giving hardly generates any deep commitment 
to philanthropy, i.e. institutionalized philanthropy, and expectation of impactful 
philanthropy. Thus, even if their giving conflicts with their functional inefficiency, 
entrepreneurs may still conform to the old way of charitable practices. Third, Chinese 
entrepreneurs simply abandon charitable giving and civic engagement when there is a 
“conflict” or failure of donation effectiveness (such as brand enhancement) resulting from 
government charity scandals, and when other civil nonprofit organizations are not 
available (X. Liu, 2012; Pang & Yan, 2008). This finding is inconsistent with previous 
research on institutional entrepreneurship theory, which suggests “conflict” is a source for 
change. It seems that the “conflict” will not bring change if the practice is prosocial and 
not perceived to be directly linked to organizational survival, nor to apparently advanced 
business performances efficiencies. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the heterogeneity resulting from the civil network will 
contribute to the Chinese entrepreneurs’ creation of foundations, but this hypothesis is not 
supported by the statistical results. The reason for the limited influence of the 
involvement of civil organization in prompting autonomy and independence through 
creation of foundations might be for the reasons below. First, the civil organizations that 
entrepreneurs are involved with have satisfied their philanthropic interest. As described 
previously, the entrepreneurs’ civil involvement is measured by their leadership role in 
the organization, and the leadership position may give the entrepreneurs control and 
understanding of their philanthropic resources. Thus, the need for establishing an 
independent philanthropic institution can be diluted. Second, entrepreneurs are exposed 
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to heterogeneous social networks, but not all the networks exert the same influence on the 
entrepreneur. Some types of networks wield stronger influence than other types of 
networks. If the civil network’s influence is weak and the people that they are interacting 
with have little exposure to the concept of creating foundations, the heterogeneity, as a 
source of change, is nullified. Third, entrepreneurs don’t trust nonprofit organizations 
(Freifelder, 2014; Pang & Yan, 2008). Nonprofit organizations’ low recognition by 
government, lack of professional management (Guo, 2009), and limited or no tax 
incentive for charitable deduction to nonprofit organizations (Kong & Deng, 2013) all 
can help explain civil organization’s limited affect on Chinese entrepreneurs’ creation of 
foundations. 
Hypothesis 3 proposes that the heterogeneity due to strategic orientation prompts an 
entrepreneur to be more likely to establish a foundation. The result has supported the 
influence of the heterogeneous cross-sectional industry on the odds ratio of establishing a 
foundation. More specifically, the estimated odds of establishing a foundation is 80.4% 
higher for entrepreneurs who have one unit more on their business intersection with 
public good provision than others. The influence of business intersection between 
“private business” and “public good” on the establishment of a foundation may be 
achieved via two mechanisms as follows. First, the intersection with public welfare areas, 
such as education, health, children, farmers, and environmental affairs, creates 
opportunities for Chinese entrepreneurs to gain deeper understanding of China’s social 
issues. This scenario is consistent with the philanthropic studies literature regarding 
altruistic giving (Radley & Kennedy, 1992; Smith & McSweeney, 2007). Second, such 
strategic intersection gives a company competitive advantage, as well as more 
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motivations, for deeper philanthropic engagement by the entrepreneur. The result is a 
confluence of private and public benefits. This finding not only confirms the role of 
heterogeneity as a condition for change, but also accords with literature on the impure 
altruistic model of wealthy individuals (Andreoni, 1990). Also, the finding is consistent 
with Zhao, Bai, & Zhao (2014)’s statement on the importance of alignment of economic 
and social goals in motivating Chinese entrepreneurs’ charitable giving. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that institutional logic, the alignment of an encouraging 
environment for charitable giving, and the demand for deeper philanthropic engagement 
may influence differently the magnitude of the response. The findings, however, do not 
support the proposition. A possible reason for this finding is that the institutional logic 
emphasizes more on giving rather than creation of foundation. The encouraging 
environment does provide an opportunity for the entrepreneur to seek a “change,” but the 
ultimate change won’t happen unless the agent sees the opportunity and turns the 
opportunity into actual “innovation.” As any other entrepreneurial activity, institutional 
entrepreneurship requires the agent to take initiatives to realize the “new idea” presented 
by a new opportunity (Thompson, 2000; Hisrich 1990). 
Hypothesis 5a argues that the higher level of political echelon attained by an 
entrepreneur, the more likely the entrepreneur will be to establish a foundation. This 
hypothesis is not supported in the above discussion. One explanation could be that high 
political echelon provides opportunities for the entrepreneur to seek for change, but 
entrepreneurs who are at the higher echelon are more likely to be co-opted by 
government, and their giving is more likely to go to government and quasi-government 
agencies. Also, entrepreneurs may continue to use charitable donations to government in 
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exchange for reinforcing their “political power,” as was the case in the late 1990s (Estes, 
1998). Similar to the institutional logic, which provides opportunities for change, the 
higher political echelon alone does not help generate the practice of foundation creation. 
However, Hypothesis 5b is supported, which assumes that entrepreneurs with 
membership in a political echelon are more likely to establish a foundation sooner than 
those who do not join the CPC or CPPCC political echelons. The odds of establishing a 
foundation is 6.15 times higher for entrepreneurs who had joined the CPC or CPPCC 
earlier and subsequent times compared to those who remain without the experience of 
joining the political echelons controlling for the political levels. Model 7 confirms the 
influence of this variable; controlling for the effect of all the six independent variables 
and all selected control variables, the odds of establishing a foundation is 5.18 times 
higher for entrepreneurs who have never joined the CPC or CPPCC. The aforementioned 
finding implies that the CPC and CPPCC membership does help the entrepreneurs 
facilitate their philanthropic institutionalization. The mechanisms behind the finding can 
be explained as follows. First, the political echelon members gained the trust of 
government for their “risky” innovative behaviors; second, members of CPC and CPPCC 
are usually outstanding individuals and the elite status not only gives them resources to 
make changes, but also positions them to be the change-makers through deeper 
philanthropic and civic engagement. Moreover, the public’s and government’s pressure 
on entrepreneurs and political elites in taking social responsibility may also explain their 
creation of foundations (Li, 2012, Zhang et al., 2012; Chen & Tourve, 2012). 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
The goal of this research is to discover Chinese entrepreneurs’ heterogeneous 
responses to conditions of the creation of foundations. It argues that the establishment of 
their own foundation is an important measure of Chinese entrepreneurs’ deeper 
commitment to exercise social responsibility and civic leadership. By exploring 
contextual factors that are conducive to Chinese entrepreneurs’ creation of foundations, a 
number of practical implications for the policy-makers, NGO leaders, and philanthropy 
advisers can be identified. As a new phenomenon, establishment of foundations in China 
is an emerging trend embraced by only a few. Who are the trailblazers? And what are the 
antecedents of the behavioral shift from direct giving to the creation of foundations? 
The institutional entrepreneurship theoretical framework was used to understand the 
“change” embedded in the old institutions. According to the institutional entrepreneurship 
theory, four major factors could lead the agent to break from old institutions and seek 
change: the conflicts between the current situation and adapted practices, heterogeneous 
social network and strategic intersection with other sectors, supportive institutional logic, 
and power. The researcher sampled 209 wealthy entrepreneurs from the 2003–2014 Top 
100 Philanthropists list produced by the Hurun Research Institute and examined the 
influence of the aforementioned four factors on the likelihood of establishing a 
foundation. The event history analysis method was used to conduct the data analysis in 
this study. Among the four factors, only the heterogeneity resulting from strategic 
industry intersection and entrepreneurs’ power are antecedents of Chinese entrepreneurs’ 
creation of foundations. Other factors, such as conflict, the heterogeneity resulted from 
the civil network, and institutional logic, were not statistically relevant in this study. 
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These results suggest that Chinese entrepreneurs who benefit from their improved 
political and social standing and increased capital are also making endeavors to take 
initiatives to contribute to the social and economic well-being in the social areas 
intersecting with the entrepreneurs’ industry. This finding is contrary to Ma & Parish 
(2006)’s research conclusion, which states that Chinese entrepreneurs donate for political 
gain. Entrepreneurs are inherently enterprising and social-economy growth -oriented in 
the mobilization of their diverse sources of capital, including their political capital. 
Although establishing a foundation is a new way of participating in social economic 
development, the contemporary Chinese entrepreneurs do not deviate from the historical 
path that follows a Corporatism model. The Corporatism model views the interaction of 
state and society as an organic whole and emphasizes the alignment of interests of both 
parties (Gu, 2004). 
The findings from this study provide a number of theoretical implications. First, the 
finding that heterogeneity resulted from strategic intersection, thereby prompting change, 
contributes to the lacuna concerning the motivations of the agent in the institutional 
entrepreneurship literature. Understanding the motivations of institutional entrepreneurs 
is highly limited (Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007). The strategic intersection provides 
the agent with both private and public benefits to seek change. This finding confirms the 
motivation and inherent propensity for the “enlightened” self-interest of entrepreneurial 
philanthropy actors. In addition, the significant effect of power on the institutional 
entrepreneurial behavior indicates another possibility of an agent’s motivation for change: 
to maintain the power status quo in a new way by conforming to the institutional 
environment’s expectation. Second, the study shows that the social network heterogeneity 
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alone does not always account for the agency. The entrepreneur is embedded in different 
networks, and these networks differ in their importance. If the civil network is not 
influential or important to the agent, the effect of a civil network on the agency is limited. 
In addition, change also hinges on the popularity of new practices and purposeful 
promotion among and within the networks. The civil network could provide “inspiration” 
and “source” for change if the current civil network is actively engaging the entrepreneur 
to seek a new practice/change. Third, the research reveals that a nurturing environment is 
not always conducive to the change. When the forces from the environment are salient, a 
transformation from more charitable giving to establishment of a foundation is more 
likely to happen. Otherwise, a latent environment may not be conducive enough to 
anticipate the change. Fourth, the effect of conflict in inducing change is not universal. In 
the case of a prosocial activity, which is not usually considered essential to organizational 
performance, conflict may not be a sufficient factor for change. Instead, organizations 
allow or ignore the failing practices in their less crucial areas. Lastly, the study confirms 
the importance of the embedded agent’s power and resource-mobilizing ability in driving 
a change in an institutional field. 
The theoretical contribution of this paper lies in its addressing the research gaps for 
testing, validating, and identifying more variables that account for agency. It also 
contributes to the expansion of methodological and practical use of institutional 
entrepreneurship. The resulting contributions to philanthropic studies and practices 
include the following: 1) additional theories that explain philanthropic innovation; 2) 
increased understanding of the behavioral shift from individual giving to creation of a 
foundation; 3) increased understanding of philanthropic giving in a nonwestern culture; 4) 
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provision of findings on high-net-worth individual's giving behavior; and 5) provision of 
theory and a road map to encourage leadership. 
Moreover, the findings of this study provide practical implications for the 
policy-makers, civic leaders, and philanthropy advisors. First, government and civic 
leaders should take measures to strengthen capacity and accountability to gain the 
entrepreneur’s trust and confidence in large-scale donations or to create foundations in 
the long run. Second, creating an encouraging environment for foundation establishment 
rather than mere charitable donations is a salient factor contributing to practical outcomes. 
Government, civic leaders, and philanthropy advisers need to articulate the need and 
importance of creating foundations. Third, we need to mobilize entrepreneurs to establish 
a foundation from a strategic perspective that benefits both the entrepreneurs’ business 
and wider society. This finding has implications for both government and philanthropy 
advisers as follows: First, to encourage and give Chinese entrepreneurs autonomy to 
participate in philanthropy through a strategic CSR perspective instead of coercive 
mandatory giving to achieve government goals only (Ge & Wang, 2010). The mandatory 
giving expectations of government may only heighten entrepreneurs’ sense of insecurity 
about their private property, eventually leading to reluctant civic engagement. Critics 
observe that Chinese entrepreneurs’ philanthropy includes characteristics associated with 
“face” and “image” projection (Hu, 2010); however, the motivation to improve ones’ 
image will not ultimately solve Chinese social problems in the long run. Second, teams of 
philanthropic advisers are essential to support the entrepreneurial philanthropists on their 
strategic philanthropy. Moreover, nonprofit leaders and government should help develop 
an open and tolerant environment that recognizes entrepreneurs in terms of their strategic 
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motivation to engage in philanthropy. Past and present representation of philanthropy as a 
“moral menace” (Zhang, 2010) needs reevaluation. Lastly, given the current Chinese 
social-political environment, more attention should be directed to the study of 
entrepreneurs who have gained the trust of government through the CPC or CPPCC; such 
insight can contribute to China’s goal of encouraging social innovation and change. Such 
insights are important, because social resource mobilizing power of entrepreneurs is 
stronger than those who are not formally part of the establishment, and public expectation 
for them is higher.  
Some limitations of this research do emerge. For instance, the phenomenon this study 
examines is very new, and less than half of the sample has experienced the event 
occurrence. The period of observation for such a rare event should be extended in the 
future to increase the uncensored sample and the study’s validity. Second, the study 
mainly collects quantitative data through various resources, and some qualitative data 
could be collected to improve, confirm, and further interpret the findings. Future research 
will focus on interviewing entrepreneurs on their moral and value perspectives of creating 
a foundation. 
There are other research topics that can be explored as a result of this study. Some 
topics that are worthy of exploration could include the following: 
• What are the factors that determine an entrepreneur’s choice of establishing a 
family foundation rather than a corporate foundation, or no foundation, or 
vice versa?  
• What are the most important factors that contribute to an entrepreneur’s 
transition from an entrepreneur to a philanthropist?  
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• How does the entrepreneurial philanthropist choose the executive director of 
his or her corporate and family foundations? 
• How is the foundation governed when the founder is on the board, compared 
to those foundations whose founder is not on the board? 
• Is there a governance difference over time for the same foundation? How 
effectively are foundations governed when established by entrepreneurs as 
compared to other types of foundations? 
•  How do the entrepreneurs understand and measure the effectiveness of their 
charitable foundations?  
From a theoretical perspective, the study primarily examines the antecedents of 
change from contextual factors, but the above analysis and discussion partially reveals 
the inadequacy of contextual factors. The following areas are worthy of being further 
explored to deepen study of intuitional entrepreneurship. First, more research on the 
institutional entrepreneurs themselves is called for, for example, the entrepreneurial 
orientation of institutional entrepreneurship, values, and self-positioning of institutional 
entrepreneurs. Second, research on how a heterogeneous network contributes to change 
can be further explored. When the potential agent is embedded in multiple networks, 
which networks and what kinds of network are most influential? Third, how does the 
evolving institutional logic (with a difference measure) influence the agency? 
Research on entrepreneurship and philanthropy is expected to bloom and shift from a 
topic of some significance to a major public policy issue (Acs, 2013). The philanthropy 
engagement of entrepreneurs concerns the healthy development and future of capitalism 
as well as the Chinese characteristic of socialism. It also concerns the development of 
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civil society. In a country like China, where wealth accumulation and concentration is 
very high and societal political problems are abundant, philanthropy, the “creative 
destruction” of wealth, carries the hope of social innovation, humanity, social mobility, 
“true strength of civil society,” and democracy. In the United States, foundations have 
served as institution-builders for many organizations, such as research institutes, 
universities, hospitals, museums, and libraries. These nonprofit organizations have been 
tied closely with daily life in the United States for many generations. Chinese economy 
and society shows promise as entrepreneurs start to distribute their wealth and reinvest in 
the country by exercising their moral imaginations. Although we must not lose sight that 
such philanthropic activity will face a variety of challenges in China, these foundations 
have potential to do “good” and do a good deal.  
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Appendix A 
Table A. Definition, Sources, and Coding 
Types of 
Variables 
Variable Definition Data sources Coding 
Dependent 
variables 
Whether and year 
of establishing 
their own 
foundation 
1) A nonprofit legal entity 
established in accordance with 
these regulations that employs 
assets donated by actual persons, 
legal entities, or other 
organizations for the purpose of 
engaging in some public benefit 
enterprise. 
2) The study examines private 
foundations only, meaning  
foundations that raise money 
from the public.  
3) Initiated and primarily funded 
by a business entrepreneur. 
China Foundation 
Center Foundation 
Directory, 
company website, 
website search 
(e.g., baidu.com) 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
Independent 
variables 
Number of 
customer- 
related industries 
The service industry embraces a 
wide range of activities, such as 
wholesale, transportation, hotel, 
dining, information technology 
service, finance, insurance, real 
estate, etc. It refers to China 
National Statistical Bureau's 
industry taxonomy. 
Company website Actual number 
of service 
industries 
 Whether 
established a fund 
(time-vary) 
The donor-advised fund is also a 
philanthropic vehicle at a public 
foundation, usually at local 
Charity Federations. 
Company website, 
Internet site (e.g. 
baidu.com), news 
release, interview 
articles 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
 Involvement of 
civil nonprofits 
His/her membership in civil 
nonprofits, especially leadership 
roles in the organization. A civil 
nonprofit organization is a social 
organization usually originated 
by nongovernment agency, such 
as entrepreneur clubs, industry 
associations, and grassroots 
nonprofit organizations. 
Company website, 
Baidu Wikipedia, 
nonprofit 
organizations 
website, Sina 
Finance website 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
 Number of 
businesses 
intersecting with 
public welfare 
Industry that provides public 
goods through private 
excludable markets. Such 
industries include art, private 
education, health, culture, 
environmental sustainability, and 
nursing, or industries that mainly 
serve the disadvantaged 
populations (e.g., farmers and 
agricultural workers), children, 
elders, and women. 
Company website Actual number 
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Types of 
Variables 
Variable Definition Data sources Coding 
 Institutional logic A pre-existing knowledge and 
belief shared by members of a 
society. In this study, it means 
the environment's overall 
attitude and actions toward 
charitable giving. A total of 32 
indicators are identified through 
Philanthropy Development 
Index of China. 
City philanthropy 
development index 
of China by 
Ministry of Civil 
Affairs of China 
Three-year 
average 
 Involvement of 
civil nonprofit 
His/her membership in civil 
nonprofits, especially leadership 
roles in the organization. A civil 
nonprofit organization is a social 
organization usually originated 
by nongovernment agency, such 
as entrepreneur clubs, industry 
associations, and grassroots 
nonprofit organizations. 
 
Company website, 
Baidu Wikipedia, 
nonprofit 
organizations 
website, Sina 
Finance website 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
 Number of 
businesses 
intersecting with 
public welfare 
Industry that provides public 
goods through private 
excludable markets. Such 
industries include art, private 
education, health, culture, 
environmental sustainability, and 
nursing, or industries that mainly 
serve the disadvantaged 
populations (e.g., farmers and 
agricultural workers), children, 
elders, and women. 
Company website Actual number 
 Institutional logic A pre-existing knowledge and 
belief shared by members of a 
society. In this study, it means 
the environment's overall 
attitude and actions toward 
charitable giving. A total of 32 
indicators are identified through 
Philanthropy Development 
Index of China. 
City philanthropy 
development index 
of China by 
Ministry of Civil 
Affairs of China 
Three-year 
average 
 Power1: political 
status level 
Member of China's People's 
Congress (CPC), and/or People's 
Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) at different 
administrative levels (i.e. county, 
city, provincial, national). 
Baidu Wikipedia, 
company website, 
CPC and or 
CPPCC website 
National CPC 
and/or CPPCC = 
4; Provincial 
CPC and/or 
CPPCC = 3; 
Municipal CPC 
and/or CPPCC = 
2; County 
CPC/CPPCC = 
1; none = 0 
 Power2: whether a 
political echelon 
member 
(time-varying) 
Whether a member of CPC or 
CPPCC, and if yes, when he/she 
joined 
Baidu Wikipedia, 
company website, 
CPC and or 
CPPCC website 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 98 
Types of 
Variables 
Variable Definition Data sources Coding 
Control 
variables  
Personal wealth 
stability 
Personal wealth refers to the 
entrepreneurs' wealth in the 
recent three years prior to 
foundation establishment (if 
there is one), or in recent 3 years 
as of 2014. If the wealth 
increases steadily or keeps the 
same level, then it is regarded as 
stable; if wealth fluctuates 
between any two years or drops 
continuously, then it is regarded 
as not stable. 
Forbes China 
Wealth List 2003–
2014, Hurun 
Wealth List 2003–
2014, China New 
Wealth List 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
 Age of 
entrepreneur 
Age refers to the age of 
entrepreneur at time of the 
foundation establishment (if 
there is one), or age as of 2014 
(if no foundation is established). 
Baidu Wikipedia, 
company website, 
Hurun Wealth List 
2003–2014, Forbes 
China Wealth List 
2003–2014 
2014  
(or year of 
foundation) 
to year of birth 
 Number of 
children 
Number of children of 
entrepreneurs. 
Forbes China 
Wealth List, Baidu 
web search, 
interview articles 
Actual number 
 Education level Educational degree the 
entrepreneur has received. 
Baidu Wikipedia, 
company website, 
magazine or 
newspaper articles 
Overseas 
education = 4; 
MBA = 3, 
graduate or  
tertiary  
degree = 2,  
k–12 = 1 
 Public-listed A corporation whose ownership 
is dispersed among the general 
public in many shares of stock 
that are freely traded on a stock 
exchange or in over-the-counter 
markets. 
Company website, 
website search, 
Sina Finance, 
CNINF (China 
Public-listed 
company data 
center) 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
 Age of company The age of company at the time 
of foundation establishment (if 
there is one), or age as of 2014  
(if no foundation is established). 
Company website, 
website search 
2014 (or year of 
foundation) to 
year of the 
company 
establishment 
 Ownership 
concentration 
The percentage of the 
entrepreneur’s shareholding in 
the company. 
Top 3,000 Chinese 
family companies 
2011–2014, 
corporate annual 
report, CNINF, 
media report, 
company website 
> = 0.5 
ownership = 1; 
<0.5 = 0 
 Family- 
controlled 
Whether the company is 
family-controlled, which is 
indicated whether entrepreneur 
has two or more family members 
in executive management team, 
and whether their family are 
major shareholders. 
Top 3,000 Chinese 
family companies 
2011–2014, 
corporate annual 
reports, CNINF, 
media report, 
company website 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
 Number of 
employees 
Number of employees that are 
reported by the company in 
recent years. 
Company website, 
corporate annual 
reports, media 
report, Industry 
Yellow Book 
1–999 = 1; 
1,000–4,999 = 
2; 5,000–9,999 
= 3;  10,000–
29,000 = 4;  
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Types of 
Variables 
Variable Definition Data sources Coding 
> =  30,000 = 5 
 Number of 
branches 
Locations, other than the main 
office, where business is 
conducted. 
Company website, 
corporate annual 
reports, media 
report, Industry 
Yellow Book 
1–29 =1; 30–
100 = 2; >100 = 
3 
 Coastal areas Cities that are situated along 
China's coastal lines, which are 
also economically developed, 
include Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, 
Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Guangdong, Hongkong, 
Guangxi, Hainan province. 
 
Company website Yes = 1; No = 0 
 Number of firms 
with a foundation 
in an industry 
group; giving to 
civil organizations 
Total number of foundations 
established  
in the entrepreneur's  
core industry. 
China Foundation 
Center 
Actual number 
  Whether the entrepreneur has 
given to civil types of 
organizations, including civil 
nonprofit, industry 
organizations, business 
associations, and individuals 
through their own company. 
Company website, 
Baidu Wikipedia, 
nonprofit 
organizations 
website, media 
report, CSR report 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
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Appendix B 
Introduction Letter Sample and Survey Questions for Telephone Interview 
Letter of Introduction 
October 8, 2014 
Dear XX President’s Office, 
My name is Baocheng Jin, the Director of Song Chingling Education Center on 
Philanthropy at Beijing Normal University Zhuhai. This letter is to introduce you to Lijun 
He, PhD candidate at Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy (the 
leading American university for the study of philanthropy around the world) and adjunct 
faculty of Song Chingling Education Center on Philanthropy at Beijing Normal 
University Zhuhai, who is conducting her field work for her dissertation on Chinese 
entrepreneurs’ heterogeneous responses to the conditions of establishing foundations. We 
seek your support to her research. She has obtained data about your company from 
widely available sources such as your company website, your annual report, media 
release, and some financial websites, but there is still some information that she doesn’t 
know where to find or she would like to ensure the data accuracy. None of this 
information is sensitive. The information you provided will be used only for academic 
purposes and your company’s identity is kept private. We hereby fax her questions for 
your review and preparation. She will contact you shortly. Thanks again for your 
cooperation. Should you have any questions regarding her project, please contact the 
Song Ching Education Center on Philanthropy at (86) 0756-6126767, 6126757 or email 
me via jbc1110@aliyun.com. 
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Yours sincerely,  
Baocheng Jin, 
Director 
Song Chingling Education Center on Philanthropy 
Beijing Normal University Zhuhai 
http://ecop.bnuz.edu.cn 
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Appendix C 
Telephone Survey Questions for Data Validation 
1. When was your company established?  
2. In which city is the company headquartered?  
3. Is it a publicly listed company?  
4. What are the core business activities of your company?  
5. How many full-time employees does your company have? 
6. How many branches does your company have? 
7. Who owns your company? 
8. Are family members of the company’s owner working in the company as senior 
leaders or sitting in the board? How many?  
9. What percentage of shares does the owner and his family hold in the company?  
10. To whom does the company usually donate money or materials? 
11. Has your company or the company’s primary owner established a charitable 
foundation?  
12. Does your company or the company’s owner have a donor-advised fund? If yes, 
what is the name of the fund? In which year was it established and where was it 
established? 
13. In what kind of social groups has owner been involved?  
14. Is the owner a CPC or CPPCC? If yes, which administrative level is his CPC or 
CPPCC membership? Which year did he obtain his first CPC or CPPCC 
membership?  
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